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INTRODUCTION 
s the U.S. military decreased in size following the Cold War, the 
role of government contractors in combat zones grew ever larger. 
The military-contractor phenomenon has mushroomed in recent years, 
and private contractors now play pivotal roles in U.S. military and recon-
struction operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.1 The government’s use of 
contractors to perform military and foreign affairs-related functions rais-
es a host of political, moral, and legal questions.2 While the U.S. inter-
vention in Iraq and Afghanistan continues with no apparent end in sight, 
these questions justifiably remain at the forefront of the national debate. 
                                                                                                                                     
 1. Lisa L. Turner & Lynn G. Norton, Civilians at the Tip of the Spear, 51 A.F. L. 
REV. 1, 3 (2001) (“Never has there been such a reliance on nonmilitary members to ac-
complish tasks directly affecting the tactical success of an engagement . . . .”) (citing 
Colonel Steven J. Zamparellii, Competitive Sourcing and Privatization: Contractors on 
the Battlefield—What Have We Signed up for?, A.F. J. LOGISTICS 9, 10 (1999)). By 2007, 
nearly 50,000 contractors provided security services in Iraq, with many more engaged in 
other facets of the U.S. effort there. JENNIFER K. ELSEA & NINA M. SERAFINO, CRS 
REPORT FOR CONGRESS, PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: BACKGROUND, LEGAL 
STATUS AND OTHER ISSUES 3 (2007). The number of defense contractors worldwide is far 
greater. Id. (noting that as of 2007 the Department of Defense employed 127,000 contrac-
tors). 
 2. The size of the contractor force has raised red flags for those who have called 
attention to the problems of accountability that occur when corporate employees substi-
tute for U.S. soldiers. Some argue that such spending is not cost-efficient. See, e.g., Jessi-
ca C. Morris, Note, Civil Fraud Liability and Iraq Reconstruction: A Return to the False 
Claims Act’s War-Profiteering Roots?, 41 GA. L. REV. 623, 623–30 (2007) (discussing 
various examples of overcharging by contractors in Iraq). Others contend that replacing 
soldiers with contractors threatens fundamental democratic values. Jon D. Michaels, 
Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic, and Strategic Problems with 
Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1001 (2004) (arguing that increasing privatization of 
the military weakens the influence of Congress and generally undermines democratic 
governance in the United States). The public attention is not misplaced. Private military 
companies have a sordid history. Military contractors have been linked to human rights 
violations in conflicts throughout the 1990s, and along with U.S. soldiers, were impli-
cated in the Abu Ghraib prison-abuse scandal in 2004. Joel Brinkley, 9/11 Set Army Con-
tractor on Path to Abu Ghraib, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2004, at A13 (discussing allegations 
of the abuse of detainees by civilian contractors at Abu Ghraib). See also ANTONIO M. 
TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (2004), 
available at http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse_report.pdf; Saad Gul, The Secre-
tary Will Deny All Knowledge of Your Actions: The Use of Private Military Contractors 
and the Implications for State and Political Accountability, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
287 (2006); Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Chal-
lenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989 (2005). 
A
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This Article addresses a narrow aspect of the nation’s use of private 
contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the lack of criminal accoun-
tability for contractors has received much critical commentary,3 scholars 
have paid comparatively little attention to the possible civil liabilities 
they face. This Article attempts to shine some light on this topic by ad-
dressing the defenses and immunities that might protect private military 
contractors from civil liability. 
To an unprecedented degree, contractors now fill roles that, in the past, 
U.S. soldiers performed exclusively.4 Their rights and duties, however, 
are not well settled.5 The U.S. Supreme Court has weighed in, creating 
what is known as the “government-contractor defense.”6 But as formu-
lated by the Court, this defense applies only to the subset of private con-
tractors that manufactures goods and equipment for the federal govern-
ment according to precise specifications.7 The contractors currently oper-
ating in Iraq are generally not of this sort.8 Most are service contractors, 
who provide personal services, rather than manufacture goods.9 For ex-
ample, these contractors offer air and land transportation for the military, 
food for the troops, and help in rebuilding Iraq’s damaged infrastructure. 
Service contractors also include “hired guns,” whose deeds and misdeeds 
have made front-page news in recent months. They are the contractors 
with whom the State and Defense Departments have contracted to supply 
                                                                                                                                     
 3. See, e.g., Geoffrey S. Corn, Bringing Discipline to the Civilization of the Battle-
field: A Proposal for a More Legitimate Approach to Resurrecting Military-Criminal 
Jurisdiction over Civilian Augmentees, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 491 (2008); Chia Lehnardt, 
Individual Liability of Private Military Personnel Under International Criminal Law, 19 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 1015 (2008). 
 4. See Turner & Norton, supra note 1. 
 5. See Posting of Bobby Chesney to the National Security Advisors: A National 
Security Law Blog, Private Military Contractors Liable to Servicemembers, 
http://www.natseclaw.com/natseclaw/2006/11/private_militar.html (Nov. 10, 2008, 5:41 
EST) (“[T]he entire discussion [of contractor liability] is quite fascinating . . . . [T]here 
has been quite a lot of development in this area of the law in the past few years, and not 
all that much scholarship.”). 
 6. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). 
 7. See id. For a discussion of the scope and limits of the Boyle government-
contractor defense, see infra Part II.B. Although the Court did not limit the government-
contractor defense in Boyle to manufacturers of weapons technology for military use, in 
practice, these are the contractors most likely to invoke the defense. Christopher R. Chris-
tensen & Anthony U. Battista, Brief, Framing the Government Contractor Defense, 38-
WTR BRIEF 12, 17 (2009). 
 8. Sam Perlo-Freeman & Elisabeth Sköns, The Private Military Services Industry, 
SIPRI INSIGHTS ON PEACE AND SECURITY 8 (2008), http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/File 
Content?serviceID=EINIRAS&fileid=858553D2-95FF-465E-24A4-F24C8EB1A04A&ln 
g=en. 
 9. Id. 
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vital security for diplomats and officials in Iraq and Afghanistan. These 
are the individuals responsible for the much-publicized shooting deaths 
of Iraqi civilians in Baghdad in September of 2007.10 
The presence of service contractors on the battlefield presents new le-
gal challenges. This is evident from the recent flurry of cases in which 
plaintiffs have brought tort claims against contractors for injuries suf-
fered in the conflicts in Iraq or Afghanistan. In each case, the defendant 
contractors have pushed for an expansion of contractor defenses to in-
clude personal services contracts for combat support. Such an expansion 
would take the defense beyond where the Supreme Court has heretofore 
permitted it to reach. The judicial opinions responding to the invocation 
of various contractor defenses are not consistent and evince confusion as 
to the source and nature of such defenses and immunities.11 
Part I of this Article assesses the extent of the contractor presence on 
foreign battlefields and the various roles contractors play in assisting 
(and in some cases supplanting) the U.S. military. Part II briefly explores 
the line of cases that gave rise to the government-contractor defense, and 
then provides an overview of the more recent cases in the lower courts 
where contractors have advocated broadening the government-contractor 
defense. Part III addresses one particular defense available to service 
contractors, the government-agency defense, and examines its potential 
to protect contractors from suit. It concludes that the government-agency 
defense should be available to private contractors acting as agents of the 
U.S. government and can be a powerful weapon in shielding them from 
suit. However, because its applicability hinges on establishing the requi-
site agency relationship, it is likely to be available to service contractors 
in very few situations. 
Part IV considers the combatant-activities exception to the waiver of 
sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).12 Discus-
sion of this exemption reveals that, as articulated by the Ninth Circuit, 
the defense may logically be expanded to protect service contractors, but 
countervailing interests, including ensuring the accountability of contrac-
tors, weigh against such expansion in the vast majority of cases.13 This 
                                                                                                                                     
 10. Sudarsan Raghavan et al., Blackwater Faulted in Military Reports from Shooting 
Scene, WASH. POST., Oct. 4, 2007, at A1. 
 11. For cases evincing confusion about the government-contractor defense, see infra 
note 74 and accompanying text. 
 12. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680 (2008). 
 13. W. PAGE KEATON, PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 5–6 (1984) 
(“There remains a body of law which is directed toward the compensation of individuals . 
. . for losses which they have suffered within the scope of their legally recognized inter-
ests . . . . This is the law of torts.”). 
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Article concludes by arguing that the interests in protecting contractors 
from civil suit are strong where the government exercises effective con-
trol over contractors, and where the defense is necessary to protect mili-
tary decision making and military discipline. 
I. THE MILITARY CONTRACTOR 
While mercenaries14 date back millennia, the rise to prominence of 
U.S. private military contractors (“PMCs”)15 can be traced to the end of 
the Cold War.16 During this period, there was a sharp reduction in the 
size of the U.S. military and an increase in the number of military dep-
loyments abroad.17 With a smaller group of soldiers from which to draw, 
the U.S. Department of Defense relied on private contractors to fill the 
gap.18 
The outsourcing of military functions increased markedly following 
the attacks of 9/11, with the U.S. military response in Afghanistan in the 
winter of 2001, and the invasion of Iraq in March of 2003.19 Contractors 
                                                                                                                                     
 14. The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions defines a mercenary as one 
who is recruited to fight, fights abroad in combat hostilities for private gain, and is not a 
national of the parties to the conflict (or of the country in which the conflict takes place). 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 47, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3. Because the contractors discussed in this Article are generally not hired to 
fight for a nation of which they are not a national, they are not properly viewed as merce-
naries. Id. 
 15. Although one could distinguish among them, this Article uses the terms “private 
military company,” “military contractor,” and “security contractor” interchangeably. 
 16. The United States has used contractors since the American Revolution. Karen L. 
Douglas, Contractors Accompanying the Force: Empowering Commanders with Emer-
gency Change Authority, A.F. L. REV, 127, 130 (2004). 
 17. The United States became involved in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and other 
locations during the 1990s. See William R. Casto, Regulating the New Privateers of the 
Twenty-First Century, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 675–80 (2006) (discussing the history of 
mercenaries and privateers, particularly during the era of the founders of the U.S. Consti-
tution); Turner & Norton, supra note 1, at 8 (addressing the causes of the “rapid and sig-
nificant growth of [Department of Defense] dependence on contractor support”). 
 18. For example, the United States has employed DynCorp contractors as mercenary-
type operators to man armed helicopters in the State Department’s antidrug efforts in 
Colombia. Nicki Boldt, Outsourcing War—Private Military Companies and International 
Humanitarian Law, 47 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 502, 511–12 (2004). DynCorp helicopters 
participated in search and rescue missions, and were involved in combat with Colombian 
rebels. Id. 
 19. See Memorandum from the Majority Staff of Committee on Oversight and Gov-
ernment Reform to Members of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 3 
(Feb. 7, 2007) (“[B]y many measures, the role of private security contractors in Iraq is 
unprecedented in its size and scope.”). 
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are currently present in these combat zones in huge numbers. More than 
100,000 contractors operate alongside U.S. forces in Iraq, at least half of 
them providing private security services.20 
Military contractors no longer simply assist in domestic construction 
projects or do the soldiers’ laundry.21 Contractors have handled up to 
thirty percent of the military’s services in Iraq.22 The integration of con-
tractors into the U.S effort in Iraq has been comprehensive. Contractors 
have served as interrogators—most notably in Abu Ghraib prison23—and 
as intelligence gatherers.24 They have provided personal security for 
high-ranking U.S. officials,25 guarded important fixed installations, in-
                                                                                                                                     
 20. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CONTRACTOR’S SUPPORT OF U.S. OPERATIONS IN 
IRAQ (2008), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/96xx/doc9688/MainText.3.1.shtml. This figure 
is striking, particularly because it is nearly as large as the number of U.S. soldiers in Iraq. 
In February of 2007, the United States had over 130,000 soldiers in Iraq. Alan Cowell, 
Britain to Trim Iraq Force by 1,600 in Coming Months, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007, at A8 
(chart showing troop levels for the various nations with soldiers in Iraq). See ELSEA & 
SERAFINO, supra note 1 (discussing the size of the contractor force in Iraq). The number 
of contractors in Iraq represents the largest deployment of contractors in wartime, and is 
ten times larger than the number in theater during the 1991 Gulf War. One in ten persons 
deployed to the war zone during the Gulf War was a private contractor. JEREMY SCAHILL, 
BLACKWATER: THE RISE OF THE WORLD’S MOST POWERFUL MERCENARY ARMY, at xv 
(2007). Kellogg, Brown & Root alone has had over 50,000 personnel in Iraq, Afghanis-
tan, and Kuwait. Id. Although violence in Iraq has at times reduced the contractor pres-
ence in the country, the number has remained high. James Glanz, Contractors Return to 
Iraq, but Numbers Are Still Down, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2004, at A10. 
 21. The Department of Defense divides contractors into three categories: systems 
support, external theater support, and theater support. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, CONTRACTOR 
SUPPORT IN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Mar. 28, 2001), available at www.dscp.dla. 
mil/contract/doc/contractor.doc; U.S. AIR FORCE GEN. COUNSEL, GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, 
DEPLOYING WITH CONTRACTORS: CONTRACTING CONSIDERATIONS (2003), available at 
https://www.safaq.hq.af.mil/contracting/affars/appendix-cc/informational/deploying-with 
-contractors.doc (discussing types of contractors). Systems-support contractors manage 
and maintain weapons systems and various logistical systems across the military, while 
external theater and theater-support contractors perform a host of logistical services from 
transportation to security functions; the distinction between the two is their location. See 
Rebecca Rafferty Vernon, Battlefield Contractors: Facing the Tough Issues, 33 PUB. 
CONT. L.J. 369, 378–82 (2004) (describing the three types of service contracts, and noting 
that the work of systems-support contractors often involves the closest contact with the 
front line); Turner & Norton, supra note 1, at 9–11 (describing the three types of contrac-
tors and the type of work they perform). 
 22. Spencer E. Ante & Stan Crock, The Other U.S. Military, BUS. WK., May 31, 
2004, at 76. 
 23. See Brinkley, supra note 2. 
 24. Steve Fainara & Alec Klein, Private Firms Collect Intelligence for Army, FORT 
WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, July 7, 2007, at A12. 
 25. For example, contractors replaced the teams of U.S. special forces that protected 
President Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan, as well as members of the Coalition Provisional 
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cluding the Baghdad airport and Iraq’s oil-production facilities, and es-
corted myriad personnel and supply convoys.26 Blackwater USA, one of 
the most prominent contractors operating in Iraq, enjoys a number of 
aviation contracts with the military to transport troops and supplies to 
combat zones.27 This company is also purportedly involved in the U.S. 
government’s secret rendition program, in which politically sensitive 
prisoners are transported overseas for interrogation by nations with ques-
tionable human-rights records.28 Reports have also implicated contractors 
in the Central Intelligence Agency’s (“CIA”) formerly secret interroga-
tion program, which included the waterboarding of terrorist suspects.29 
Although military regulations prohibit contractors from performing in-
herently governmental functions,30 including combat operations,31 reality 
                                                                                                                                     
Authority, including Chief Lieutenant Paul Bremer III, in Iraq. See David Barstow et al., 
Security Companies: Shadow Soldiers in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at A1; James 
Dao, U.S. Company to Take over Karzai Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at A24; Let-
ter from Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to the Honorable Ike Skelton, U.S. 
House of Representatives (May 4, 2004), available at http://www.house.gov/skelton/5-4-
04_Rumsfeld_letter_on_contractors.pdf (“Some Private Security Companies (PSCs) 
under contract in Iraq provide personal security services for senior civilian officials as 
well as some visiting delegations.”). Scahill describes Bremer’s security force as a “sort 
of Praetorian Guard in the war on terror.” SCAHILL, supra note 20, at 70. 
 26. James R. Coleman, Note, Constraining Modern Mercenarism, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 
1493, 1503 (2004) (discussing Vinnell Corporation’s contract to guard the Baghdad air-
port and Erinys International’s deployment of over 14,000 persons to guard oil installa-
tions); David Barstow, The Struggle for Iraq: The Contractors; Security Firm Says Its 
Workers Were Lured into Iraqi Ambush, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2004, at A1 (noting that 
Blackwater security employees guarded “five regional buildings used by the occupation 
forces”); P.W. Singer, Warriors for Hire, SALON.COM, Apr. 15, 2004, http://archive. 
salon.com/news/feature/2004/04/15/ wariors/print.html. 
 27. See August Cole, U.S. Expands Prince Ties, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2007, at A15 
(noting that the Department of Defense awarded Blackwater’s aviation affiliate Presiden-
tial Airways a $92 million contract for aviation services in Central Asia). 
 28. SCAHILL, supra note 20, at 253. 
 29. Siobhan Gorman, CIA Likely Let Contractors Perform Waterboarding—
Interrogation Work Outsourced Heavily; Legality Uncertain, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2008, 
at A3 (citing two unnamed current and former intelligence officials who stated that con-
tractors were used because the CIA lacked experience with detention and interrogation). 
 30. See Antenor Hallo De Wolf, Modern Condottieri in Iraq: Privatizing War from 
the Perspective of International and Human Rights Law, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
315, 346 (2006) (noting that under army regulations, inherently government functions are 
those most closely associated with the public interest). 
 31. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 4-0, DOCTRINE FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT 
OF JOINT OPERATIONS V-1 (Apr. 6, 2000), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/ 
new_pubs/jp4_0.pdf (“In all instances, contractor employees cannot lawfully perform 
military functions and should not be working in scenarios that involve military combat 
operations where they might be conceived as combatants.”); Jeffrey F. Addicott, Con-
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has not conformed to this rule.32 Contractors have been in the thick of 
combat,33 and the distinction between military and nonmilitary functions 
has broken down. At one point in 2005, the number of U.S. contractor 
fatalities exceeded the number of troop deaths for all non-U.S. and -U.K. 
coalition members.34 
The U.S. military’s reliance on the private sector has hardly been inad-
vertent. The federal government has long emphasized the importance of 
privatizing functions that the private sector could perform more efficient-
ly. Under Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) Circular A-76, 
for example, federal agencies are periodically required to compare the 
cost of performing an activity in-house and the cost of contracting it 
out.35 In recent years, the Bush administration’s ideological bent and fo-
                                                                                                                                     
tractors on the “Battlefield”: Providing Adequate Protection, Anti-Terrorism Training, 
and Personnel Recovery for Civilian Contractors Accompanying the Military in Combat 
and Contingency Operations, 28 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 323, 347 (2006) (discussing the restric-
tions on contractors, and noting that while they are discouraged from carrying firearms 
for self-defense and are prohibited from using them in direct support of combat opera-
tions, “the dangers of the battlefield and the limitations of the military to provide ade-
quate force protection may subject contractors to bodily harm, necessitating the contrac-
tors’ possession of fire-arms for self defense”). 
 32. C. Douglas Goins, Jr., Gregory L. Fowler & Taavi Annus, Regulating Contrac-
tors in War Zones: A Preemptive Strike on Problems in Government Contracts, BRIEFING 
PAPERS 8–9 (2007) (“Given the nature of the circumstances under which they must oper-
ate, Government contractors . . . may be called upon to perform functions that could be 
characterized as direct participation in hostilities.”) (citation omitted). 
 33. See Barstow, supra note 25 (noting that “security companies “fought to defend 
coalition authority employees and buildings from major assaults in Kut and Najaf,” and 
indicating elsewhere that private contractors are on occasion mistaken for enemy units 
and are fired upon) (“With thousands of private security employees now guarding supply 
lines, buildings and reconstruction projects—and with thousands more on the way—they 
are increasingly being drawn into firefights and other combat situations that traditionally 
have been left to the military.”); Clayton Collins, War-Zone Security Is a Job for . . . 
Private Contractors?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 3, 2004 (“Private firms—even ones 
with well credentialed staff—have already stepped well beyond the job of guarding facili-
ties and conducting other protective services . . . .”). Scahill describes an incident in 
which Blackwater security guards fired on a taxicab that had crossed paths with a State 
Department official they were transporting, killing a passenger. SCAHILL, supra note 20, 
at 72. 
 34. Brief for Prof’l Servs. Council & Int’l Peace Operations Ass’n as Amici Curiae at 
8, Nordan v. Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC (In re Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC), 
460 F.3d 576 (4th Cir. 2006). By February of 2007, almost 800 private contractors had 
been killed in Iraq, while over 3000 had been injured. Nearly 800 Iraq Contractors 
Killed, USA TODAY.COM, Feb. 23, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007 
-02-23-contractors_x.htm. 
 35. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB 
CIRCULAR NO. A-76, PERFORMANCE OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES (2003). However, the 
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cus on reformulating the military placed increased emphasis on outsourc-
ing.36 Former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld envisioned a slimmer, 
more effective fighting force with contractors playing a vital role.37 As 
part of the “Total Force,” contractors would replace soldiers in “nation 
building” and other tasks, freeing troops to focus on warfare.38 
Outsourcing military and military-support functions to civilians places 
many actors beyond the chain of command and allows politicians to con-
ceal the true costs of war.39 Nevertheless, without the sizeable contractor 
corps currently in Iraq, and absent substantial troop increases, the Bush 
                                                                                                                                     
Circular exempts the Department of Defense from its coverage in times of war or military 
mobilization. Id. See also Richard B. Nettler, Privatization of Military Support Services, 
in PRIVATIZING GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS 15-2–15-15 (Deborah Ballati ed., 2001). 
 36. Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accoun-
tability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 549, 551–
54 (2005) (discussing the Bush administration’s “rush to outsource”). See Addicott, supra 
note 31, at 328 (“Without question, civilian contractors will continue to be integral partic-
ipants in the ongoing War on Terror.”); Gordon L. Campbell, Contractors on the Battle-
field: The Ethics of Paying Civilians to Enter Harm’s Way and Requiring Soldiers to 
Depend on Them, Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics (Jan. 27–28, 2000) 
(on file with Brooklyn Journal of International Law) (“The use of contractors to support 
military operations is no longer a ‘nice to have.’ Their support is no longer an adjunct, ad 
hoc add-on to supplement a capability. Contractor support is an essential, vital part of our 
force projection capability—and increasing in its importance.”). It is also worth noting 
that longstanding government policy has focused on privatizing government activities, 
where possible, to increase efficiency and to avoid competing with private business. See 
SCAHILL, supra note 20, at xvii (noting that “[t]he often-overlooked subplot of the wars of 
the post-9/11 period is the outsourcing and privatization they have entailed” and that 
ideologues such as Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith came to power with two major 
goals—regime change in Iraq and other countries, and carrying out “the most sweeping 
privatization and outsourcing operation in U.S. military history”). 
 37. See Charles Tiefer, The Iraq Debacle: The Rise and Fall of Procurement-Aided 
Unilateralism as a Paradigm of Foreign War, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 13–19 (2007) (de-
scribing the transformation of the military and the role of contractors in this transforma-
tion). 
 38. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 75 (Feb. 6, 2006), 
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf (“The Depart-
ment’s Total Force—its active and reserve military components, its civil servants, and its 
contractors—constitutes its warfighting capability and capacity.”). 
 39. See SCAHILL, supra note 20, at xx (“With almost no public debate, the Bush ad-
ministration has outsourced to the private sector many of the functions historically han-
dled by the military. In turn, these private companies are largely unaccountable to the 
U.S. taxpayers from whom they draw their profits.”). One seldom hears of contractor 
deaths on the evening news, but over 770 civilian contractors have died in Iraq since the 
beginning of the war. Howard Witt, America’s Hidden War Dead, CHICAGO TRIB., Mar. 
26, 2007, at A1. The combined death toll from the conflict in Iraq rises twenty percent 
when contractor deaths are added to the over 4000 U.S. soldiers killed. Iraq Coalition 
Casualty Count, http://icasualties.org/oif/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2008). 
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administration’s widely publicized goals for reconstruction would proba-
bly have been beyond reach. Given the likelihood that a peaceful, demo-
cratic Iraq cannot be won by force of arms, the contractor presence in 
Iraq has been critical to U.S. success there. To perform their duties effec-
tively, military contractors may require legal protection against civil lia-
bility. However, the law should also protect vital American interests in 
holding tortfeasors accountable. Having substituted contractors for sol-
diers, what level of civil legal protection do contractors enjoy in their 
new role? In this new kind of war, in which humanitarian reconstruction 
goes hand in hand with combat, is protecting the nation’s contractors as 
essential as protecting its soldiers? This Article queries what legal pro-
tections do and should apply to service contractors in the current con-
flicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The following section briefly addresses 
the development of contractor defenses, providing a framework for eva-
luating and criticizing the current model. 
II. THE GOVERNMENT-CONTRACTOR DEFENSES: A BACKGROUND 
A. Sovereign Immunity, the FTCA, and Its Exceptions 
Sovereign immunity in the United States derives from the English 
common law principle, developed during the Tudor reign and cemented 
by the time of Blackstone, that “no suit or action can be brought against 
the king, even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction 
over him.”40 While sovereign immunity bars suits against the United 
States,41 it is not without exception. Individuals aggrieved by government 
action may circumvent sovereign immunity where the government has 
waived it. These statutory waivers include the FTCA, which permits suits 
against the government for the tortious acts of its employees.42 
“Mark[ing] the culmination of a long effort to mitigate unjust conse-
quences of sovereign immunity,”43 the FTCA subjects the United States 
                                                                                                                                     
 40. DONALD L. DOERNBERG, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OR THE RULE OF LAW 74 (2005) 
(quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 235 (1765)). 
Since the earliest days of our nation, courts have upheld the view that the federal gov-
ernment may not be sued without its consent. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205 
(1882); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 610–11 (4th ed. 2003). Under the 
Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the states also enjoy immunity from suit. 
U.S. CONST. amend. 11. Because suits against government contractors implicate federal 
employees or federal contractors exclusively, state sovereign immunity will not be ad-
dressed here. 
 41. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40. 
 42. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680 (2008). 
 43. WILLIAM B. WRIGHT, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 1 (1957). The legislation 
created a damages remedy against the United States whereas previously a plaintiff would 
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to liability in cases where injury is caused by the “negligence or wrong-
ful act or omission of any employee of the Government” while acting in 
the scope of his or her employment in circumstances under which a pri-
vate person would be liable.44 
The FTCA includes a variety of key exceptions to the general waiver 
of immunity. These exceptions reflect unique federal interests that justify 
retaining sovereign immunity in particular contexts. There are two im-
portant exceptions at the heart of the military contractor’s efforts to in-
voke federal sovereign immunity. The first exception is the “discretio-
nary-function” exception, which preserves federal sovereign immunity in 
suits arising from “the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise 
or perform a discretionary function” by the federal government or its 
employees.45 Essentially, the discretionary-function exception prevents 
courts from second-guessing legislative and administrative conduct that 
implements policy goals.46 The discretionary-function exception forms 
the basis for the government-contractor defense as developed and ratified 
by the Supreme Court in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., discussed 
below. The second exception is the “combatant-activities” exception, 
which excepts suits against the federal government “arising out of the 
combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, 
during time of war.”47 This exception is intended to restrict interference 
with decisions of federal agents regarding military affairs.48 It forms the 
basis for a separate contractor defense, explored in Part IV. 
B. Establishing the Contractor Defenses: Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Con-
struction Co., Feres v. United States, and Boyle v. United Technologies 
Corp. 
Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., decided in 1940, is the first 
important U.S. Supreme Court opinion addressing a contractor’s defense 
from civil liability for performing a government contract.49 The case in-
                                                                                                                                     
be required to sue the employee, with no guarantee that said employee had the means to 
pay the resulting judgment. See id. at 5–6, 44–46 (discussing that the purpose of the 
FTCA is to waive sovereign immunity in limited circumstances and allow a private per-
son to sue the United States for money damages). 
 44. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2008). 
 45. Id. § 2680(a). 
 46. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 467 U.S. 797, 
814 (1984) (“Congress wished to prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and 
administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the 
medium of an action in tort.”). 
 47. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j). 
 48. See Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 769 (9th Cir. 1948). 
 49. Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 19–20 (1940). 
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volved the construction by a contractor of a dike along the Missouri Riv-
er.50 When the construction of the dike caused a diversion of the river 
that washed away a portion of the plaintiff’s land, the landowner sued 
both the government and the contractor.51 The Court held the contractor 
immune from suit based on the basic principles of agency: “if . . . author-
ity to carry out the project was validly conferred, that is, if what was 
done was within the constitutional power of Congress, there is no liabili-
ty on the part of the contractor for executing its will.”52 In other words, 
when an agency relationship exists, the contractor can avoid liability 
where the U.S. government itself would not be liable.53 
The Court later decided Feres v. United States, which examined 
whether soldiers are permitted to sue the U.S. government for injuries 
they suffered in the course of duty.54 The Court concluded that the FTCA 
does not create a cause of action for soldiers suing the military for ser-
vice-related injuries,55 stating that the “federal character of military ser-
vice and the need for uniformity in the system of compensation,”56 along 
with the ample compensation afforded service members through veter-
                                                                                                                                     
 50. Id. at 19. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 20–21. 
 53. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 524–26 (1988) (Brennan, 
J. dissenting) (discussing Yearsley); McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 
1331, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (discussing Yearsley); Charles E. Cantu & Randy W. Young, 
The Government Contractor Defense: Breaking the Boyle Barrier, 62 ALB. L. REV. 403, 
408–09 n.27 (1998) (discussing the “agency” principle at issue it Yearsley). Of course, to 
the extent that the contractor’s immunity derives from the United States’ sovereign im-
munity, the FTCA circumscribes it. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). So, for example, a contrac-
tor-agent might not enjoy Yearsley’s protection where the discretionary-function excep-
tion or other FTCA exception would not protect the government. Cantu & Young, supra 
at 407–08. 
 54. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). Feres actually involved three consol-
idated cases. The plaintiffs (and their decedents) contended that they had suffered inju-
ries, not in combat, but from the malpractice of military physicians in two of the cases, 
and from a barracks fire in the other. Id. at 136–37 (describing the Feres case, involving a 
negligence action arising from a fire in barracks that “should have been known to be 
unsafe because of a defective heating plant,” the Jefferson case, in which a physician 
allegedly left an army towel inside a patient following an operation, and the Griggs case, 
another malpractice case). 
 55. Id. at 146. 
 56. Jonathan Turley, Pax Militaris: The Feres Doctrine and the Retention of Sove-
reign Immunity in the Military System of Governance, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 11 
(2003) (describing the rationales for the Feres decision). Moreover, soldiers already re-
ceived ample compensation for service-related injuries through veterans’ benefits. Feres, 
340 U.S. at 145. The Supreme Court has also suggested that military discipline presents 
the best rationale for the Feres decision. United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). 
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ans’ benefits,57 justified its ruling. In this interpretation, couched as an 
interpretation of the FTCA, the Court effectively added another excep-
tion to the statute.58 Subsequent cases supplied another rationale for what 
emerged as the Feres “doctrine”—that permitting suits by soldiers 
against the military would undermine military discipline and morale.59 
Lower courts later drew upon Feres to craft a defense for government 
contractors. Courts found that where the government mandated and ap-
proved specifications for a product, and had special knowledge of the 
dangers of the product, a contractor manufacturing it would share in the 
government’s Feres immunity.60 Holding a contractor liable in tort for 
executing the will of the military, the courts reasoned, would permit the 
very type of interference with military decision making that Feres sought 
to prevent.61 
In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., the Supreme Court rejected this 
line of cases and found that Feres could not be the basis for a govern-
ment-contractor defense. In Boyle, the estate of a marine who died in a 
helicopter crash sued the maker of the military helicopter, alleging de-
sign defects in the escape hatch.62 The Court reasoned that applying the 
Feres principle to protect military contractors would produce “results 
that are in some respects too broad and in some respects too narrow.”63 
That is, the result would be to immunize contractors from all tort claims 
by soldiers while sanctioning virtually all civilian claims.64 
Instead of applying Feres, the Court focused on the unique federal in-
terests at stake in the military’s contracts with manufacturers of military 
                                                                                                                                     
 57. See Turley, supra note 56.  
 58. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, at 624–26. 
 59. See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 691 (1987) (“Suits brought by service 
members against the Government for service-related injuries could undermine the com-
mitment essential to effective service and thus have the potential to disrupt military dis-
cipline in the broadest sense of the word.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985); Tillett v. J.I. Case 
Co., 756 F.2d 591, 597–98 (7th Cir. 1985); McKay v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 704 F.2d 
444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 61. See Jonathan Glasser, Note, The Government Contract Defense: Is Sovereign 
Immunity a Necessary Prerequisite?, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 495, 521 (1986) (“The court 
focused on fairness to contractors who are unable to obtain indemnification under Feres 
and Stencel . . . and the necessity of preventing the judiciary from interfering with mili-
tary decisions . . . .”). 
 62. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 502–03 (1988). 
 63. Id. at 510. 
 64. Id. at 510–11. The “narrow” aspect of applying Feres would be compelled by the 
fact that Feres only addresses suits against the federal government by military personnel. 
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
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equipment,65 identifying two such interests: the obligations and rights of 
the United States under its contracts, and the civil liability of federal of-
ficials for actions undertaken in the course of their duties.66 The Court 
recognized that it “makes little sense to insulate the Government against 
financial liability . . . when the Government produces equipment itself, 
but not when it contracts for the production.”67 The ultimate financial 
burden would pass through to the government, as contractors would raise 
their prices “to cover, or to insure against, contingent liability for the 
Government-ordered designs.”68 Contracting with private entities for the 
production of military equipment involves discretionary decisions that 
balance competing military, technical, and cost considerations.69 Accor-
dingly, the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA authorizes a 
defense for contractors in these cases. 
The Court set forth a three-part test to identify cases in which the “pol-
icy of the ‘discretionary function’ would be frustrated.”70 Contractors are 
not liable for design defects in military equipment where (i) the govern-
ment approved “precise specifications”; (ii) “the equipment conformed to 
those specifications”; and (iii) the contractor “warned the United States 
about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the 
supplier but not to the United States.”71 Thus, Boyle bars only those suits 
in which the government balanced the pros and cons of a particular ac-
tion (be it the design and production of a fighter jet or the design and 
construction of a levy), contracted with the private sector, furnished pre-
cise specifications to the contractor, and supervised the execution of his 
or her work. 
The immunity Yearsley provides to contractors is derived from the 
immunity of the government itself.72 However, the “government-
                                                                                                                                     
 65. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 505–06. 
 66. Id. at 504–05. 
 67. Id. at 512. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. The Court adopted the third prong of the test, because otherwise the prospect 
of immunity from liability would create incentives for the contractor to withhold know-
ledge of risks. Id. 
 72. Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21 (1940) (characterizing the 
contractor as an “agent or officer of the Government”). Of course, the Feres doctrine is 
itself a creation of judge-made federal common law. But its construction of the FTCA is 
that Congress did not intend to remove the protective cloak of sovereign immunity from 
the United States in the case of certain suits by servicemen and women. McMahon v. 
Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (describing Yearsley 
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contractor defense” described in Boyle does not require a strict agency 
relationship between the contractor and the government.73 The defense is 
rooted in federal preemption,74 which displaces state law in cases where 
it would interfere with unique federal interests.75 While a successful de-
fense of sovereign immunity ousts the court’s jurisdiction to hear the 
case, federal preemption of state law arises by operation of federal com-
mon law and represents an affirmative defense that the contractor must 
raise and prove.76 
Boyle is the wellspring of the modern government-contractor defense. 
Lower courts have consistently applied the Boyle test in product-liability 
suits against weapons manufacturers.77 At least one lower court has ex-
panded Boyle to cover nonmilitary equipment,78 while another has ap-
plied the Boyle test for a services contract for the maintenance of military 
                                                                                                                                     
and its principle that “a common law agent may sometimes share in the sovereign im-
munity of the United States”). 
 73. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507 (describing when preemption would require dismissal of 
suits against contractors). 
 74. This is the case despite some confusion in judicial opinions about the source of 
the government-contractor defense. See, e.g., Burgess v. Colo. Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844, 
846 (11th Cir. 1985) (“If a contractor has acted in the sovereign’s stead and can prove the 
elements of the defense, then he should not be denied the extension of sovereign immuni-
ty that is the government contract defense.”); Zinck v. ITT Corp., 690 F. Supp. 1331, 
1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“The government contractor defense grew out of the historic prin-
ciple of sovereign immunity. When a contractor acts under the authority and direction of 
the United States, it shares in the immunity enjoyed by the Government.”). 
 75. Implied preemption may be contrasted with other types of preemption, including 
express preemption, in which Congress, by statute, expressly displaces state law. See, 
e.g., Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006) (specify-
ing that ERISA legislation expressly preempts state laws affecting employee benefit 
plans). 
 76. See Rogers v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 308 F.3d 785, 791 (7th Cir. 2002) (describing 
the preemption defense as an affirmative defense); Snell v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 
107 F.3d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The military contractor defense is an affirmative 
defense; Bell has the burden of establishing it.”); Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 
10, 18 n.5 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Immunity involves not an affirmative defense that may ulti-
mately be put to the jury, but a decision by the court at an early stage that the defendant is 
entitled to freedom from suit in the first place.”). 
 77. See, e.g., Michael D. Green & Richard A. Matasar, The Supreme Court and the 
Products Liability Crisis: Lessons from Boyle’s Government Contractor Defense, 63 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 637 (1990) (criticizing the Boyle decision as a flawed application of the 
Court’s ability to fashion federal common law). 
 78. See Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1993) (extending contrac-
tor liability to a manufacturer of an ambulance); In re Haw. Federal Asbestos Cases, 960 
F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1992) (refusing to do the same). 
410 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:2 
equipment.79 Few contractors assisting the U.S. government in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, though, are likely to meet the Boyle criteria. Contractors 
providing food for an army mess tent, transporting fuel across the Iraqi 
desert, or supplying an armed escort for a high-profile official will in 
most cases lack the requisite direction and control by the military.80 The 
Supreme Court has given no indication of a willingness to expand Boyle 
to cover such situations.  
The courts in Koohi v. United States and Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft 
Co. took a different approach to contractor defenses. These courts 
created a defense for contractors grounded not in the discretionary-
function exception to the FTCA, but rather, in the combatant-activities 
exception.81 The next Section discusses these two cases. It then surveys 
the recent litigation in which courts have been asked to expand the exist-
ing frontiers of contractor defenses. 
C. Preemption as a Defense Rooted in the Combatant-Activities Excep-
tion to the FTCA: Koohi v. United States, and Bentzlin v. Hughes Air-
craft Co. 
Not long after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Boyle, the Ninth Circuit 
confronted a claim arising from a U.S. Navy cruiser’s mistaken attack on 
an Iranian airliner during the “Tanker Wars” between the United States 
and Iran in the 1980s.82 In Koohi v. United States, the family of passen-
gers on Iran Air Flight 655 sued the United States and the private manu-
facturers of the Aegis air-defense system allegedly responsible for misi-
                                                                                                                                     
 79. Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2003). Note that 
this application of the test is significant because it comes from the Eleventh Circuit, 
where a court recently issued an opinion in McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 
F. Supp. 2d 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2006). 
 80. This is not to say that contractors would not, in those cases, be following some 
sort of military-prescribed protocol. However, specifications will often be insufficiently 
precise to conform to the Boyle government-contractor defense. Nor will it generally be 
the case, in transporting fuel, for example, that the contractor could not do it according to 
military protocol and in conformity with the applicable standard of care. See Boyle v. 
United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 509 (1988) (“The contractor could comply 
with both its contractual obligations and the state-prescribed duty of care. No one sug-
gests that state law would generally be pre-empted in this context.”). 
 81. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1330–31 (9th Cir. 1992); Bentzlin v. 
Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486, 1486 (C.D. Cal. 1993). 
 82. The “Tanker Wars” describe the small-scale skirmishes between the United States 
and Iran in the Persian Gulf during Iran’s war with Iraq. Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1330–31. The 
U.S. military adopted a policy of reflagging Kuwaiti oil tankers under the American ban-
ner to further protect them. Steve Liewer, Teamwork Saved Stricken Warship: Navy Fri-
gate Hit Iranian Mine in Persian Gulf 20 Years Ago, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 19, 
2008. 
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dentifying the plane.83 The Ninth Circuit based its ruling of contractor 
nonliability on the combatant-activities exception to the FTCA.84 The 
court found that because the ship was engaged in combatant activities at 
the time of the accident, the plaintiffs could not seek relief from the 
United States.85 
The court articulated three reasons for immunizing the military from 
tort liability. First, although a central premise of tort theory is deterrence, 
Congress did not intend military personnel to exercise caution in combat 
situations.86 Second, while tort liability seeks “to provide a remedy for 
the innocent victim,” it would make little sense to provide remedies for 
civilians injured as a result of negligence as opposed to those who suf-
fered from the “overwhelming and pervasive violence which each side 
intentionally inflicts on the other.”87 Finally, even though tort theory po-
sits that tortfeasors should be punished, Congress could not have in-
tended this principle to apply to U.S. combat personnel.88 According to 
the Ninth Circuit, one purpose of the combatant-activities exception “is 
to recognize that during wartime encounters no duty of reasonable care is 
owed to those against whom force is directed as a result of authorized 
military action.”89 Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiffs could not 
proceed against the United States.90 And on the basis of the same factors, 
it immunized the makers of the Aegis missile system from these claims.91 
One year later, the Central District of California heard Bentzlin v. 
Hughes Aircraft Co., a case in which the family members of six marines 
sued a weapons manufacturer.92 The marines were killed when a misdi-
rected missile struck their jeep near the Kuwait-Saudi border.93 The court 
determined that the claims against the contractors were preempted, after 
reviewing Koohi’s description of the three principles animating the com-
batant-activities exception.94 Recognizing the national interest in decisive 
                                                                                                                                     
 83. Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1330–31. 
 84. Id. at 1333 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j)). The combatant-activities exception en-
compasses federal sovereign immunity injuries that arise “out of the combatant activities 
of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.” Id. 
 85. Id. at 1332–36. 
 86. Id. at 1134–35. 
 87. Id. at 1335. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1337. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486, 1487 (C.D. Cal. 1993). 
 93. Id. at 1487. The complaint alleged that the defendant contractors had negligently 
manufactured, tested, inspected, and distributed the missile. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1492–93. 
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action in combat situations, the Bentzlin court observed that permitting 
suits to proceed against contractors may endanger the lives of soldiers 
because it would encourage contractors to act with undue caution, there-
by delaying the delivery of weapons to the front.95 Although tort law is a 
means to punish tortfeasors, punishment is not as important in the mili-
tary-contractor context because the U.S. government is “in the best posi-
tion to monitor the wrongful activity by contractors, either by terminat-
ing their contracts or through criminal prosecution.”96 In order to protect 
the dignity of soldiers, victims of contractor negligence should not be 
compensated differently from those injured or killed by enemy fire.97 
The Bentzlin court took Koohi a step further. Koohi adopts the prin-
ciple that no duty of care is applicable to those against whom the military 
was directing force.98 Bentzlin supports a more expansive view of com-
batant-activities preemption, identifying a federal interest in protecting 
contractors’ decisive acts even where their negligent actions cause harm 
to fellow soldiers. Decided in the early 1990s, Koohi and Bentzlin stand 
virtually alone in justifying the preemption of state law tort claims 
against private companies on the basis of the combatant-activities excep-
tion in the FTCA. Although private military companies have recently 
sought to revive combatant-activities preemption, several courts have 
rejected this defense by distinguishing Koohi and Bentzlin on the facts.99 
                                                                                                                                     
 95. Id. at 1493. 
 96. Id. at 1493–94. The court notes that the government may monitor the contractors’ 
quality of work and may terminate the business relationship. Id. at 1494. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1337 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 99. In Fisher v. Halliburton, family members of Halliburton employees sued the 
company on the grounds that it had used the decedents’ truck convoy as a “decoy” know-
ing that it would be attacked by anti-American forces. Fisher v. Halliburton, 390 F. Supp. 
2d 610, 612 (S.D. Tex. 2005). The court in Fisher rejected defendants’ preemption argu-
ment by distinguishing the facts from those in Koohi. Id. at 615–16. The court held that 
the combatant-activities defense applies only where the defective products cause the in-
jury, not where injury results from a contractor’s negligent performance of a service con-
tract. Id. at 616 (“The narrow ‘combatant activity’ exception to the waiver of sovereign 
immunity in the [FTCA] does not bar the claims in this case.”). See also Fisher v. Halli-
burton, No. H-05-1731, 2005 WL 2001351, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2005) (denying a 
rehearing, and noting that Koohi’s holding confined combatant-activities preemption to 
claims alleging defective products and refusing to expand it beyond its “current bounda-
ries”). 
  Similarly, in Lessin v. Kellogg, Brown & Root, the court again found the reason-
ing of Koohi and Bentzlin inapplicable. In Lessin, a soldier suffered an injury while es-
corting a contractor caravan in Iraq. Lessin v. Kellogg, Brown & Root, No. H-05-01853, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS. 39403, at *1–2, 13–14 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2006) (generally dis-
tinguishing the procurement process, which “‘inevitably implicates nuanced discretion 
and sophisticated judgments by military experts,’” from convoy duties, which do not) 
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Two cases are of particular interest: McMahon v. Presidential Airways, 
Inc.100 and Ibrahim v. Titan Corp.101 
McMahon involved U.S. serviceman in Afghanistan who died when pi-
lots employed by a military contractor caused a plane to crash into a 
mountain.102 The defendants sought to dismiss the claims by relying on 
the Feres doctrine, the government-agency defense, and combatant-
activities preemption.103 In McMahon, the district court emphatically re-
jected the defendant’s claim that it was acting as an agent of the govern-
ment and therefore could qualify for derivative Feres immunity.104 Un-
persuaded by the defendant’s argument that the Defense Department’s 
widespread use of contractors in lieu of soldiers now mandates expand-
ing Feres to cover private parties, the court ruled that the Feres defense 
is only available where the United States is the defendant.105 The Ele-
venth Circuit, on appeal, did recognize a policy justification for enlarging 
Feres immunity to cover private contractors—immunity might be neces-
sary to protect the making and execution of “sensitive military judg-
ments.”106 Yet, the Eleventh Circuit refrained from actually extending 
Feres immunity for the same reason the Supreme Court in Boyle jetti-
soned it as a basis for the government-contractor defense—it would pre-
vent soldiers, but not civilians from bringing claims against contrac-
tors.107 
                                                                                                                                     
(quoting Fisher, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 616). The plaintiff claimed that the defendants’ negli-
gent inspection, maintenance, and repair of the truck caused him a debilitating head in-
jury. Id. at *2. A vehicle accident was also the subject of Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown 
& Root, where the Northern District of Georgia rested its refusal to find the plaintiff’s 
claim preempted on this same distinction—between design defects and the provision of 
services. Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1380–81 (N.D. 
Ga. 2006). The Southern District of Texas also rejected a defendant’s attempt to invoke 
the combatant-activities exception. Smith v. Halliburton Co., No. H-06-0462, 2006 WL 
2521326, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2006). 
 100. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2006). 
 101. Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 102. McMahon, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1318. 
 103. Id. at 1315. 
 104. Id. at 1327. The court also pointed out that “[s]tate law tort suits by service mem-
bers against contractors for injuries incident to service have been permitted to go forward 
by numerous courts in other contexts.” Id. at 1328. 
 105. Id. at 1325–27. Presidential argued that Boyle’s rejection of Feres as the basis for 
the government-contractor defense is inapplicable in the current situation because the 
Department of Defense had so integrated contractors into its battle plans. Id. Apart from 
highlighting the changing face of the U.S. approach to warfare, the defendants offered 
little to show that this situation had so undermined Justice Scalia’s analysis in Boyle so as 
to abandon it. Id. at 1328. 
 106. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1351 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 107. Id. at 1354–55. 
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The district court also rejected the defendant’s’ reliance on the comba-
tant-activities exception.108 It found that while the government-contractor 
defense is available solely to military procurement contracts in which the 
government “dictates design specifications,” the combatant-activities 
exception is a legislative preservation of sovereign immunity applicable 
only to the government itself.109 Even if the combatant-activities excep-
tion were theoretically available to private parties, the court continued, it 
is available only for “alleged defects in complex military machinery,” 
not for “negligent provision of services.”110 On appeal, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit did not address the contractor’s combatant-activities preemption 
claim.111 
In Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., Iraqi detainees and their families sued con-
tractors, including employees of Titan Corp., for abuses the detainees 
allegedly suffered at Abu Ghraib prison.112 In contrast to McMahon, the 
District Court for the District of Columbia revived combatant-activities 
preemption.113 Ibrahim noted that the exemption seeks to protect against 
suits that would interfere with the effective execution of war;114 suits 
against contractors would inevitably lead them to pass on the costs to the 
government.115 The court recognized that Boyle permits preemption of 
suits against contractors where a suit would create a significant conflict 
between unique federal interests and tort liability. The court concluded 
that the existence of a unique federal interest in the detention and inter-
rogation of prisoners depends on whether the contractors were “essential-
ly acting as soldiers” or were “soldiers in all but name.”116 Satisfied that 
Titan had met its burden of showing that its employees were “under the 
direct command and exclusive operational control of the military chain 
of command,” the court granted summary judgment in favor of the de-
                                                                                                                                     
 108. Id. at 1338. 
 109. McMahon, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1330. 
 110. Id. at 1331. Interestingly, this statement impliedly repudiated controlling Eleventh 
Circuit precedent. In Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, the Eleventh Circuit had found 
that the government-contractor defense of the Boyle variety could apply to contracts for 
the performance of services, not merely to procurement contracts. Hudgens v. Bell Heli-
copters/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 111. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1366 (citing the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdic-
tion). 
 112. Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 113. Id. at 18 (“The inquiry then turns to whether allowing a suit to go forward would 
conflict with the purposes of the FTCA and whether defendants have shown that they 
were essentially soldiers in all but name.”). 
 114. Id. at 18–19. 
 115. Id. at 19. 
 116. Id. 
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fendant.117 The viability of a combatant-activities defense does not hinge 
on the type of the contract—procurement or services.118 The purpose of 
the exception is to “shield military combat decisions from state law regu-
lation.”119 Preemption of claims against contractors may thus be neces-
sary to protect the efficient functioning of the military itself: 
Where contract employees are under the direct command and exclusive 
operational control of the military chain of command such that they are 
functionally serving as soldiers, preemption ensures that they need not 
weigh the consequences of obeying military orders against the possibility 
of exposure to state law liability. It is the military chain of command that 
the FTCA’s combatant activities exception serves to safeguard . . . .120 
The above cases demonstrate that private military contractors, when 
faced with civil claims arising from their actions in support of the U.S 
military missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, have attempted to employ  
defenses generally available to the federal government itself. These de-
fenses are by and large of two varieties. The first seeks to invoke the so-
vereign immunity of the government directly under a claim of agency. 
The government-agency defense is such an example. The second type of 
defense argues that interference with a unique federal interest requires 
preemption. Preemption under the combatant-activities exception to the 
FTCA falls under this category. With few exceptions, courts have not 
been willing to oblige these contractor defenses. The Supreme Court has 
provided very little guidance regarding government-contractor liability, 
and the scope of the government-agency defense and the combatant-
activities exception remains unclear. Given the ubiquitous presence of 
contractors in recent U.S. military efforts, the stakes are high. The 
McMahon court appropriately acknowledged this fact, noting that 
“[r]amifications may flow from allowing U.S. service personnel to sue 
private military contractors who operate on or near the battlefield, espe-
cially considering the extent to which our military forces now use private 
                                                                                                                                     
 117. Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 118. The court cited to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Hudgens v. Bell Helicop-
ters/Textron, which articulated the view that the controlling consideration is whether a 
contractor’s liability under state law would create a “significant conflict with a unique 
federal interest.” Ibrahim, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 4 n.3 (citing Hudgens v. Bell Helicop-
ters/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1345 (11th Cir. 2003)). 
 119. Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 120. Id. By contrast, the court ruled that Titan’s co-defendant, CACI Corporation, had 
not satisfied the “soldier in all but name” test. Id. at 10. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims 
against CACI survived summary judgment. Id. 
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contractors in this manner.”121 The next Part of this Article addresses the 
first of these possible defenses, the government-agency defense. The dis-
cussion offers a perspective on the limitations of an agency-based de-
fense for service providers and a baseline for comparing it with the com-
batant-activities defense. 
III. THE GOVERNMENT-AGENCY DEFENSE 
Since the Supreme Court’s controversial decision, the Feres doctrine 
remains an insurmountable barrier to soldiers seeking monetary damages 
from the United States for injuries they have sustained incident to mili-
tary service. No court has yet applied Feres directly to a private party.122 
But where a contractor proves the agency relationship necessary to estab-
lish the government-agency defense, the contractor, as a government 
agent, might then share in the government’s own Feres immunity.123 
The government-agency defense cloaks a contractor who performs a 
task under government supervision and direction with the government’s 
own immunity from suit.124 Despite the defense’s seeming simplicity, 
courts have struggled with its application. Particularly troublesome has 
been identifying how close the relationship between the contractor and 
the government must be before the defense will apply.125 Although de-
                                                                                                                                     
 121. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1324 (M.D. Fla. 
2006). 
 122. Id. at 1325 (“Defendants cite no case in which the Feres doctrine has been held 
applicable to private contractors.”). See also Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 3–7, McMahon v. Presidential Airways, 
Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2006) [hereinafter McMahon Motion to Dismiss] 
(arguing for the expansion of Feres to cover military contractors). 
 123. A contractor who convinces a court to accord him or her derivative Feres immun-
ity would enjoy an immunity defense. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). 
A government contractor who can successfully plead a defense under the factors the Su-
preme Court laid out in Boyle will have successfully pleaded the affirmative defense of 
preemption. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). The gov-
ernment-agency defense is a defense of derivative sovereign immunity, and thus ousts the 
court of jurisdiction to hear the case. Feres, 340 U.S. at 138. The Boyle contractor de-
fense is an affirmative defense the contractor must plead and prove. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 
512. 
 124. Yearsley v. W.A. Ross. Constr. Co, 309 U.S. 18, 19–21 (1940). See also general-
ly Richard Ausness, Surrogate Immunity: The Government Contractor Defense and 
Products Liability, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 985, 993 (1986) (listing relevant cases). 
 125. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 740 (11th Cir. 1985) (“This 
defense is rarely invoked, and its elements are nowhere clearly stated.”). 
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fendants rarely succeed in winning dismissal of claims under the gov-
ernment-agency defense, the cases are not uniformly bleak.126 
Courts have not been consistent in explaining the agency principles at 
issue in the government-agency defense.127 When plaintiffs seek to hold 
the government liable through the acts of private parties, courts have re-
quired that the government “control the detailed physical performance of 
the contractor.”128 This standard presents a high bar for those contractors 
seeking to establish an agency relationship.129 However, in Butters v. 
Vance International, Inc., the Fourth Circuit found a contractor to be de-
rivatively immune from suit.130 Citing Yearsley, the court held that “con-
                                                                                                                                     
 126. See Cantu & Young, supra note 53, at 408 (“This agency version of the govern-
ment contractor defense has proved difficult to apply because the defendant contractor 
must show that an agency relationship existed between it and the government. Manufac-
turers who contract with the military are not hired as employees; rather, the basis of the 
relationship is contractual. Thus, for many military contractors, this defense is ill-
suited.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 127. For example, an independent contractor may be an agent where the contractor is 
the fiduciary of the principal. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 740 n.5 (overruled on other grounds) 
(“[A]t least in manufacturing defect cases arising in a military setting, a firm must be 
more than simply an independent contractor to be regarded as the government’s agent.”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14(N) (1958) (“One who contracts to act on behalf 
of another and subject to the other’s control except with respect to his physical conduct is 
an agent and also an independent contractor.”). In the context of the current conflict in 
Afghanistan, the military has imposed duties of loyalty and obedience to the United 
States approximating those owed by a fiduciary. Afghanistan General Order Number 
One, cited in Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 10–11, McMahon v. Presidential Air-
ways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-15303) [hereinafter McMahon Appel-
late Brief]. 
  Several circuits have held that an independent contractor may be an agent where 
the government exercises “overall control” of the contractor’s performance. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14(N) (1958). For example, the Ninth Circuit found that an 
independent contractor operating a boat as a charter for the Navy was an agent where the 
government exercised “overall” but not “day to day” control over the vessel. Dearborn v. 
Mar Ship Operations, Inc., 113 F.3d 995, 997–98 (9th Cir. 1997). See also Favorite v. 
Marine Pers. & Provisioning, Inc., 955 F.2d 382, 388 (5th Cir. 1992) (deeming the tanker 
serving the Department of Defense an agent); Petition of the United States, 367 F.2d 505, 
510–11 (3d Cir. 1966) (considering the tanker serving the Department of Defense an 
agent). 
 128. Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 527–28 (1973) (“[T]he distinction between 
the servant or agent relationship and that of independent contractor turn[s] on the absence 
of authority in the principal to control the physical conduct of the contractor in perfor-
mance of the contract.”). 
 129. See Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 307 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[H]ere, the 
United States neither supervised nor controlled the day-to-day operations or the custodial 
duties.”). 
 130. Butters v. Vance Int’l, Inc., 225 F.3d 462, 466 (4th Cir. 2000). Although the court 
dealt with sovereign immunity in the context of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
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tractors and common law agents acting within the scope of their em-
ployment for the United States have derivative sovereign immunity.”131 
In Yearsley, the contractor invoked derivative sovereign immunity in a 
situation in which the government was clearly immune. That the Butters 
court did not similarly analyze how the government exercised control 
over the “detailed physical performance of the contractor” suggests that a 
less rigorous analysis prevails where the government treasury is not vul-
nerable.132 
Although the case law on the government-agency defense is sparse and 
inconsistent in places, the defense presents a viable means by which ser-
vice contractors may avoid liability. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, 
Inc., though, demonstrates how elusive the defense can be in practice. 
The government contracted with Presidential Airways to provide troop 
and ammunition transports between military installations in Afghanistan 
and neighboring countries.133 The government selected the type of plane, 
the general routes the company was to use in Afghanistan, the timing of 
the flights, as well as what to carry.134 It also asked the company to fly at 
lower altitudes to decrease its vulnerability to anti-aircraft fire.135 Al-
though the facts suggest that the government had a substantial role in 
dictating the terms of the flights, the contractor admitted that the gov-
ernment did not exercise control during the performance of its mission.136 
Had the court in McMahon adopted a less restrictive approach to agency, 
the pilot and other Presidential Airways employees might well have been 
                                                                                                                                     
(“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611 (2005), rather than the FTCA, the court relied 
on Yearsley. Id. at 466. FSIA generally prohibits courts from adjudicating the actions of 
foreign sovereigns, thus shielding them with immunity in U.S. courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1604. 
FSIA contains a number of exceptions, however. Id. §§ 1605–1607. 
 131. Butters, 225 F.3d at 466 (citing Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 
21–22 (1940)). The Butters court referenced the government’s need to delegate functions, 
and added that “sovereigns need flexibility to hire private agents to aid them in conduct-
ing their governmental functions.” Id. 
 132. Citing City of Worcester v. HCA Mgmt. Co.,753 F. Supp. 31, 37–38 (D. Mass. 
1990), the Butters court asserted that “[p]ursuant to sovereign immunity, a private com-
pany which contracts with the federal government to perform the duties of the govern-
ment will not be held liable for its actions on behalf of the government.”). Butters, 225 
F.3d at 466.  
 133. McMahon Appellate Brief, supra note 127, at 10–11. 
 134. Id. at 11. 
 135. Id. at 13–14. 
 136. Id. at 32 (“Presidential was completely subject to the military’s control, except as 
to the physical performance of the mission.”). 
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deemed agents because the military retained “overall control” of their 
conduct.137 
Defendants may also invoke a separate line of cases that has extended 
“official immunity” to contractors. Official immunity differs from sove-
reign immunity in that the former generally protects individuals from 
liability, while the latter protects the government and its agencies.138 In 
Mangold v. Analytic Services, Inc., the Fourth Circuit granted official 
immunity to contractors for their assistance as part of an Air Force inves-
tigation.139 The court cited two Supreme Court opinions, Barr v. Mateo140 
and Westfall v. Erwin,141 where the Court articulated the dimensions of 
official immunity for acts of federal employees. These cases held that a 
federal official who performs a discretionary act in the scope of his or 
her employment is absolutely immune from a state law tort lawsuit 
where the benefits of such immunity outweigh its costs.142 Although the 
test for official immunity has been replaced by statute, this common-law 
approach remains the standard when considering whether contractors 
may enjoy official immunity.143 In Mangold, the Fourth Circuit broadly 
concluded that “[i]f absolute immunity protects a particular governmen-
tal function, no matter how many times or to what level that function is 
delegated, it is a small step to protect that function when delegated to 
private contractors, particularly in light of the government’s unques-
tioned need to delegate governmental functions.”144 The court relied on 
Boyle as a rationale for extending immunity to a contractor to whom the 
government delegated a discretionary function.145 Of course, reliance on 
Boyle is inapposite, as the case cannot be read to support such a cavalier 
extension of immunity.146 Numerous cases, though, have followed Man-
                                                                                                                                     
 137. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1328 (11th Cir. 
2005) (rejecting Feres as an available defense). 
 138. 63C Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers and Employees § 305. 
 139. Mangold v. Analytic Services, Inc., 77 F.3d 1442 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 140. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569–73 (1959). 
 141. Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 295 (1988). 
 142. Id. at 296 n.3. 
 143. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d); Beebe v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 129 F.3d 
1283, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that “Westfall remains the common law rule” for 
official immunity). 
 144. Mangold, 77 F.3d at 1447–48. 
 145. Id. at 1448. 
 146. See Sean L. Brohan, Recent Decisions: The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit, 56 MD. L. REV. 1044, 1165, 1175 (1997). Boyle stands for the narrow 
proposition that when a contractor meets defined criteria, a federal common-law preemp-
tion defense applies. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). It 
does not extend immunity based on agency. Id. at 502–03. 
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gold’s extension of immunity to contractors based on the delegation of a 
discretionary function to a private contractor.147 These cases, applying 
the principle of immunity for discretionary acts enunciated in Westfall to 
private individuals and entities, have generally been confined to situa-
tions where private actors have cooperated with government investiga-
tions or have served as financial intermediaries.148 Courts have not yet 
applied official immunity in the context of suits against military pro-
curement or service contractors.149 
Regardless of which type of immunity the service contractor operating 
in Iraq or Afghanistan invokes—the government-agency defense or offi-
cial immunity under Mangold—courts have concluded that a showing of 
agency or the performance of a delegated, discretionary function is not 
alone sufficient to justify immunity.150 In both cases, a defendant must 
affirmatively justify immunity by showing that the benefits of immunity 
outweigh its costs.151 The private contractor must establish how and why 
the immunity doctrines that developed to protect the government also 
apply to private contractors. 
For example, the court in McMahon considered how a service contrac-
tor could uphold its claim of derivative sovereign immunity under the 
Feres doctrine.152 Merely establishing an agency relationship was not 
enough.153 After considering the various rationales for Feres immunity 
and whether they could logically be expanded to cover private contrac-
tors, the court found the final rationale for Feres—the desire to prevent 
courts from second-guessing military decisions—to be a compelling jus-
tification for extending derivative sovereign immunity to contractors.154 
                                                                                                                                     
 147. See, e.g., Murray v. Northrop Grumman Info. Tech., Inc., 444 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 
2006); In re Series 7 Broker Qualification Exam Litig., 510 F. Supp. 2d 35, 44 (D.D.C. 
2007) (citing Mangold, 77 F.3d 1442). 
 148. Research discloses no case that has so extended the principle announced in Man-
gold outside of the government investigation or financial intermediary context. 
 149. See Adams v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 700, 707 (W.D. Va. 
2002) (denying defendants’ immunity). 
 150. See McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1344 (11th Cir. 
2007). 
 151. Mangold, 77 F.3d at 1447. 
 152. The court reviewed the law of qualified immunity for government officers, con-
cluding that while the United States is immune from suit “by default,” an officer’s immunity 
must be “affirmatively justified.” McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1344. The court concludes that 
by analogy to qualified immunity, which applies as necessary to protect the government 
functions the private party is exercising, it must consider how extending Feres immunity 
is justifiable in the case of military contractors. Id. at 1345–51. 
 153. Id. at 1346 (“It is thus not enough for Presidential to point to its (alleged) status as 
a common law agent and the government’s (alleged) Feres immunity.”). 
 154. Id. at 1348. 
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According to the court, allowing a plaintiff’s suit to proceed against a 
military contractor would threaten the separation of powers principle.155 
Immunity would necessarily apply in order to avoid the trial of “suits 
involving quintessential or peculiarly military judgments that courts 
should not hear as a matter of prudence, rather than a matter of constitu-
tional law.”156 The court, in such cases, would lack the competence to 
appropriately evaluate the “proper tradeoff between military effective-
ness and the risk of harm to the soldiers.”157 Although the court in 
McMahon recognized a policy justification for extending the govern-
ment’s immunity from suit to private contractors, it declined to do so.158 
The McMahon court’s concern for insulating sensitive military deci-
sions from judicial scrutiny is sensible. For example, private contractors 
have been implicated in the transportation of alleged enemy combatants 
in the “war on terror.”159 In a suit against such a contractor, information 
regarding U.S. activities associated with the transportation of terrorist 
suspects is closely held, as nondisclosure is considered critical to U.S. 
national security.160 Permitting a suit to proceed against a contractor in 
these circumstances would necessitate discovery into the adequacy of 
interrogation procedures and other internal controls.161 Although restric-
tions on judicial interference with such activities pose a risk that an indi-
vidual injured by unlawful government conduct will be left without a 
remedy, the law has nonetheless insulated such matters from judicial in-
quiry. 
                                                                                                                                     
 155. Id. at 1350. 
 156. Id. In its allusion to constitutional law, the court refers to the constitutional prin-
ciple of nonjusticiability, particularly the political question doctrine, under which courts 
are constitutionally prohibited from hearing a case. Id. at 1350–51. 
 157. Id. at 1350. 
 158. Id. at 1353. 
 159. See SCAHILL, supra note 20, at 253 (describing contractors’ role in rendition and 
interrogation programs); Gorman, supra note 29 (describing how contractors have been 
involved in waterboarding terror suspects). 
 160. See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007). In El-Masri, the 
court affirmed the dismissal of a suit by a German citizen of Lebanese descent alleging 
torture at the hands of the CIA and private contractors as part of the war on terror. It con-
cluded that the state-secrets doctrine precluded discovery in his case, and that the suit 
could not be maintained absent the very information placed beyond his reach by the 
court. Id. at 308–12. 
 161. Courts have said that in other circumstances inquiries into military decision mak-
ing may impermissibly threaten military discipline. See, e.g., McConnell v. United States, 
478 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding, in the Feres context, that a suit by a de-
ceased soldier’s family arising from his death in a recreational boating accident was 
barred, as military discipline would be threatened should an inquiry be made into the 
military’s maintenance of boats and the adequacy of instructions concerning their use). 
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While the McMahon court agreed that the Feres doctrine, insofar as it 
protects military decision making from judicial inquiry, is applicable to 
military contractors, it refused to extend the military-discipline rationale 
to private contractors.162 Unlike soldiers, contractors are not in the mili-
tary chain of command.163 Thus, the court reasoned that the deleterious 
effects on military discipline spawned by permitting soldiers to challenge 
military orders in court do not apply in the case of defendant contractors. 
However, in light of Supreme Court precedent, the focus on the defen-
dant’s status in the chain of command is arguably misplaced. In United 
States v. Johnson, the Supreme Court held that the Feres doctrine pre-
vented a serviceman’s suit against the government where the alleged tort-
feasor was a civilian employee of a government agency.164 The plaintiff 
in the case argued that a civilian air traffic controller in the Federal Avia-
tion Agency (“FAA”) acted negligently when he provided a Coast Guard 
helicopter pilot with incorrect coordinate information, causing him to 
crash.165 The Court noted that “[c]ivilian employees . . . play an integral 
role in military activities” and that “the FAA and the United States 
Armed Services have an established working relationship that provides 
for FAA participation in numerous military activities.”166 Johnson illu-
strates two points. First, it shows that the application of the Feres doc-
trine depends more on the military status of the plaintiff (whose relation-
ship to the government is of unique federal interest) than on the identity 
of the tortfeasor.167 The Court held that since “Johnson went on the res-
cue mission specifically because of his military status,” the case fell 
“within the heart of the Feres [doctrine].”168 Second, Johnson suggests 
that the prospect of a lawsuit need not interfere directly with the military 
chain of command. As the Court stated, “[A]n inquiry into the civilian 
                                                                                                                                     
 162. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1348. 
 163. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 715-16, CONTRACTOR DEPLOYMENT GUIDE 1-1 
(1998), available at http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/p715_16.pdf. 
 164. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987). In this case, the civilian was an 
employee of the Federal Aviation Agency. Id. at 683. 
 165. Id. at 682–83. 
 166. Id. at 691 n.11. 
 167. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Johnson recognized that its prior opinions ad-
dressing the Feres doctrine had not treated the status of the tortfeasor as critical. Id. at 
685. See Courtney W. Howland, The Hands-Off Policy and Intramilitary Torts, 71 IOWA 
L. REV. 93, 102 (1985) (“The key to the Feres holding was the plaintiff’s identity: he was 
an active serviceman. The defendant’s military status was not dispositive, for civilians 
may sue the military under the FTCA.”) (citations omitted). 
 168. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 692. 
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activities would have the same effect on military discipline as a direct 
inquiry into military judgments.”169 
The principles of Johnson apply to military contractors. Like the civi-
lian air-traffic controller in Johnson, private military companies work 
closely with military authorities although they operate outside of the 
chain of command.170 Johnson demonstrates that the United States will 
be immune where a soldier sues the government in connection with or-
ders or information negligently furnished that causes his or her injury. As 
contractors are part of the “Total Force,”171 it is difficult to conclude that 
the outcome should change on the basis that a contractor provided the 
erroneous flight information rather than a civilian in the FAA. Johnson 
makes the tortfeasor’s identity functionally irrelevant. The threat to mili-
tary discipline and the goal of preventing the second-guessing of orders 
are of equal magnitude in both cases. In light of Johnson, the court in 
McMahon should not have so readily dismissed the applicability of 
Feres’s military-discipline rationale in support of contractors’ derivative 
sovereign-immunity defense. Indeed, the military-discipline and military-
decision making rationales support the expansion of the Feres immunity 
defense to private contractors acting as agents of the government. That it 
did not do so suggests that the Eleventh Circuit’s true objection was to 
Feres itself.172 
Nevertheless, even if the principles underlying Feres might be ex-
tended to protect military contractors via the government-agency defense, 
courts should do so with caution. Courts confronting the government-
agency defense should adopt a restrictive approach to agency. Otherwise, 
contractors would be immune from suit even in situations where the gov-
                                                                                                                                     
 169. Id. at 691 n.11. 
 170. U.S. Dep’t of Army Regulation 715-9, Contractors Accompanying the Force § 2-
3(a) (Oct. 29, 1999), available at http:// www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r715_9.pdf. 
 171. In 1973, the Department of Defense adopted the “Total Force Policy,” which 
recognized the contribution reservists, civilian government workers, and contractors 
could “add to the active forces in ensuring the national defense.” U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO NO. 95-5, DOD FORCE MIX ISSUES: GREATER RELIANCE 
ON CIVILIANS IN SUPPORT ROLES COULD PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT BENEFITS 10 (1994). 
 172. Reflecting the Supreme Court’s rejection of Feres as the basis for the govern-
ment-contractor defense, the Eleventh Circuit in McMahon declined to extend Feres im-
munity due to the inequity it would create for military plaintiffs. McMahon v. Presiden-
tial Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1353 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Even if such an immunity is 
warranted, however, we do not believe that the Feres doctrine is an appropriate ground 
upon which to build it. The reason is that an immunity built on Feres would only prevent 
soldiers—and would not prevent civilians—from bringing suit against private military 
contractors making or executing sensitive military judgments.”). Effectively announcing 
its view that Feres was wrongly decided, the court chose to contain the damage by refus-
ing to expand it. Its criticism of Feres is indirect but unmistakable. 
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ernment exerts little control over contractor discretion and where critical 
federal interests are not implicated. However, if a contractor successfully 
demonstrates a bona fide agency relationship, courts should assess the 
principles underlying the Feres doctrine and, in appropriate cases, extend 
immunity to private contractors. 
The narrow government-agency defense is not the only defense availa-
ble to service contractors. In certain areas critical to the national interest, 
contractors may raise the combatant-activities exception as an affirma-
tive defense without demonstrating agency. Judicial opinions differ on 
the meaning and scope of the exception, though. And courts are unde-
cided about its potential for preempting tort suits against service contrac-
tors involved in combat operations. However, the ubiquitous presence of 
contractors on the battlefield in the global war on terror has thrust this 
defense back into the legal limelight. Substituting for soldiers, contrac-
tors have argued that their status justifies protecting them against civil 
claims arising from their participation in combat and combat-support 
activities. Whether this protection is warranted and which circumstances 
make it so are two questions addressed in the following section. 
IV. APPLYING THE COMBATANT-ACTIVITIES EXCEPTION TO TORT 
CLAIMS AGAINST SERVICE CONTRACTORS: SOUND DEFENSE OR 
FLAWED REASONING? 
As service contractors have faced civil claims arising from their con-
duct in Iraq and Afghanistan, many have turned to combatant-activities 
preemption as a defense.173 Judges are now addressing the combatant-
activities exception on virtually a blank slate.174 The following discussion 
                                                                                                                                     
 173. See, e.g., Defendant Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss, Lessin v. 
Kellogg, Brown & Root, 2006 WL 3940556 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2006) (No. H-05-1853); 
Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Smith v. Halliburton Co., 2006 WL 
1342823 (S.D. Tex. May 16, 2006) (No. H-06-0462); Reply in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss by Defendants Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc. and Halliburton Energy 
Services, Inc., Carmichael v. Kellogg, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1373 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 10, 2006) 
(No. 1:06-cv-0507); Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider 
and/or Clarify Order Denying Motion to Dismiss with Respect to Combatant Activities 
Exception, Fisher v. Halliburton, 390 F. Supp. 2d 610 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (No. H-05-1731) 
[hereinafter Fisher Motion]. For example, in Fisher, defendants argued that the court had 
confused the combat-activities exception with the government-contractor defense, which 
it argued it had not raised. Id. at 1. (“Defendants move for reconsideration of the Order 
with respect to the combatant activities exception because it appears that the application 
of that exception became confused with the government contractor defense based on the 
separate discretionary function exception, which Defendants did not raise or brief.”). 
 174. See Laura A. Dickinson, Accountability of Private Security Contractors Under 
International and Domestic Law, 11 ASIL INSIGHTS, Dec. 26, 2007, http://www.asil.org/ 
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critically evaluates this exception. It first defines its scope and suggests 
how it may apply to military contractors. After exploring why increasing 
criminal jurisdiction over military contractors is an insufficient substitute 
for tort liability, this section identifies a federal interest supporting com-
batant-activities preemption, namely, fostering bold, decisive action by 
military contractors. It then examines competing interests, focusing on 
contractor discretion as the critical variable, and concludes by arguing 
that combatant-activities preemption may be appropriate, but only where 
contractor discretion falls below a critical threshold. 
A. The Scope of the Combatant-Activities Exception 
The combatant-activities exception to the FTCA reflects the Congres-
sional policy that the United States should not be subject to suit in cases 
concerning its armed forces’ combatant activities during wartime.175 The 
legislative history interpreting the exception is conspicuously sparse.176 
The Ninth Circuit in Johnson v. United States, though, concluded that the 
exception must have been intended to cover those combatant activities 
“which by their very nature should be free from the hindrance of a possi-
ble damage suit.”177 
The statute leaves the terms “war,” “arising out of,” and “combatant 
activities” undefined, so courts have been left to clarify their mean-
ings.178 Broadly defining “war,” courts have noted that a declared state of 
war need not exist to trigger the combatant-activities exception.179 
                                                                                                                                     
insights/2007/12/insights071226.html (in discussing the grant of summary judgment in 
Titan, noting that “[t]he precise scope of the contractor immunity doctrine, however, 
remains unresolved”). 
 175. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2008). The FTCA waiver of liabili-
ty provides that the district courts shall have jurisdiction over suits  
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negli-
gent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while 
acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances 
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in 
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.  
Id. § 1346(b)(1). 
 176. The Ninth Circuit in Johnson v. United States—an early case addressing the ex-
ception—noted that the record was “singularly barren” of evidence that would assist in 
interpreting the exception. Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 769 (9th Cir. 1949). 
See also Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 18 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 177. Johnson, 170 F.2d at 769. 
 178. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j). 
 179. See, e.g., Vogelaar v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 1295, 1302 (E.D. Mich. 1987) 
(indicating that the exception would apply to cases arising before the declared end of 
hostilities in the Vietnam War); Skeels v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 372 (W.D. La. 1947) 
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“[S]ignificant armed conflict” short of war is sufficient.180 The Ninth 
Circuit offered this definition of “war” when considering the combatant-
activities exception in the context of the Tanker Wars.181 
The term “arising out of” has also been construed expansively. John-
son involved the destruction of clam farms by a U.S. Navy vessel return-
ing from duty in the Pacific Ocean following World War II.182 The owner 
of the farms sued the government for damages.183 The court interpreted 
“arising out of” broadly, finding that an activity at least incidentally re-
lated to combat could qualify.184 Accordingly, the court held that the de-
livery of ammunition to combatants in a “fighting area” met the “arising 
out of” requirement.185 
Courts have struggled when defining the term “combatant activities.” 
Considering the types of activities service contractors perform demon-
strates how slippery the concept of combatant activities can be. For ex-
ample, in McMahon, the military hired the defendant contractor to trans-
port troops and material from one military base in Afghanistan to anoth-
er.186 Since the President declared Iraq and Afghanistan, along with the 
skies above these countries, combat zones,187 by analogy to Johnson v. 
                                                                                                                                     
(holding that the combatant-activities exception was potentially applicable during the 
Second World War even though the incident occurred in the United States). 
 180. See Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1334 (9th Cir. 1992). When con-
struing the phrase “in light of contemporary realities,” the court found it significant that 
“in modern times hostilities have occurred without a formal declaration of war far more 
frequently than following a formal pronouncement.” Id. at 1334. In arguing that congres-
sional authorization for the use of force need not take the form of a declaration of war, 
Jack Goldsmith and Curtis Bradley observe this trend. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack 
Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
2047, 2059–60 (2005) (“[T]he United States has been involved in hundreds of military 
conflicts that have not involved declarations of war . . . . [T]he United States has not de-
clared war in any of its many post-World War II conflicts, even though some of them 
have been significant and prolonged.”). See also Morrison v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 
78, 79 (M.D. Ga. 1970) (“[A] war is no less a war because it is undeclared.”). Note also 
that the district court in the McMahon case found that combat activities in Afghanistan in 
2004 were sufficient to implicate the combatant-activities exception. McMahon v. Presi-
dential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2006). 
 181. Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1334. 
 182. Johnson, 170 F.2d at 768. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 770. 
 185. Id. (noting that the exception would encompass “activities both necessary to and 
in direct connection with actual hostilities”). 
 186. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1336–38 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(describing the role the contractor Presidential played in shuttling troops and material). 
 187. Designation of Afghanistan and the Airspace Above as a Combat Zone, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 64,907 (Dec. 14, 2001) (designating Afghanistan and its airspace as “an area in 
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United States this would likely qualify as a combatant activity,188 particu-
larly because the flight apparently contained munitions as well as mili-
tary personnel.189 
Skeels v. United States involved a fisherman who was injured by fall-
ing debris from a plane engaging in military exercises in the United 
States during the Second World War.190 Concluding that the combatant-
activities exception did not bar the suit, the court in Skeels held that 
combatant activities means only those activities that are connected to 
engaging the enemy or engaging in physical force with the enemy.191 The 
court in Koohi adopted Johnson’s slightly different definition of comba-
tant activities. It found that combatant activities are those “‘activities 
both necessary to and in direct connection with actual hostilities.’”192 
Similarly, in Vogelaar v. United States, a case in which a plaintiff al-
leged that the military had acted negligently in failing to timely identify 
the remains of a deceased soldier, the court considered identifying and 
accounting for soldiers in a combat zone as constituting a combatant ac-
tivity under the FTCA.193 Transportation of troops in a combat zone 
would not qualify as a combat activity under Skeels, but would likely 
suffice under the less restrictive Koohi and Vogelaar formulations. 
Even under a generous definition of combatant activities, many servic-
es performed by contractors do not qualify. In Smith v. Halliburton, the 
relatives of deceased service members sued Halliburton under a theory of 
premises liability for negligently permitting a suicide bomber to infiltrate 
a mess tent the company ran in northern Iraq.194 Although the court dis-
                                                                                                                                     
which Armed Forces of the United States are and have been engaged in combat”); Desig-
nation of Arabian Peninsula Areas, Airspace, and Adjacent Waters as a Combat Zone, 56 
Fed. Reg. 2663 (Jan. 21, 1991) (designating Iraq a combat zone for purposes of combat 
pay under IRS regulations). 
 188. See Johnson, 170 F.2d 767. 
 189. See McMahon Appellate Brief, supra note 127, at 10–11 (describing munitions 
transportation). 
 190. Skeels v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 372, 373 (W.D. La. 1947). 
 191. See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) 
(finding that combatant activities is limited to engaging an enemy in combat). 
 192. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1333 n.5 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting John-
son, 170 F.2d at 770). 
 193. Vogelaar v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 1295, 1302 (E.D. Mich. 1987). A case 
from the Middle District of Pennsylvania held that the exception applied when a Veterans 
Administration official was accused of negligently injuring a soldier who suffered a com-
bat injury during World War II. Perucki v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 959 (M.D. Pa. 
1948). Because the injury suffered during the medical examination would not have arisen 
but for the original injury suffered in combat, the exception applied. Id. at 961. 
 194. Smith v. Halliburton Co., No. H-06-0462, 2006 WL 2521326, at *1 (S.D. Tex. 
Aug. 30, 2006). 
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missed the plaintiffs’ complaint on political-question grounds, the court 
described how the military itself remained in control of security ar-
rangements, with the contractor merely in charge of food service.195 In 
Lessin v. Kellogg, Brown & Root, the court found the combatant-
activities exception inapplicable where the ramp-assist arm of a contrac-
tor’s truck injured a soldier while the contractors were accompanying a 
supply convoy in Iraq.196 
In defining combatant activities, one may distinguish between provid-
ing food for soldiers and transporting troops and military supplies be-
tween bases, the former simply being too remote from actual combat.197 
The latter, essential to any military operation, clearly has a direct connec-
tion to hostilities.198 Such missions are vulnerable to ground attacks by 
insurgents and threats associated with flying according to riskier military 
flight plans.199 
Transporting civilian reconstruction supplies, like in Lessin, is a closer 
case. In Iraq, the overtly military and civilian reconstruction tasks must 
                                                                                                                                     
 195. Id. at *2–3. 
 196. Lessin v. Kellogg, Brown & Root, No. H-05-01853, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
39403, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2006). 
 197. See Smith, 2006 WL 2521326, at *3. Transportation of troops and food service 
are, admittedly, both important to any military effort. They are distinguishable, however. 
Troop transport is an activity inextricably linked to combat, whereas food service is not. 
The latter occurs regardless of deployment, but this is not true of the former. 
 198. The possibly apocryphal quip by General Omar Bradley, Field Commander in 
North Africa and Europe during the Second World War and later Chairman of the Joint 
Chief of Staff, comes to mind in this context: “[a]mateurs study tactics; professionals talk 
about logistics.” Richard Hornstein, Protecting Civilian Logisticians on the Battlefield, 
38 ARMY LOGISTICIAN 14 (2006). Winston Churchill also said that “in total war it is quite 
impossible to draw any precise line between military and non-military problems.” Gre-
gory Cantwell, Nation Building: A Joint Enterprise, 37 PARAMETERS 54 (2007). The 
court in Bentzlin noted, however, that the first Koohi principle might even apply in the 
case of the transportation of military material. Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. 
Supp. 1486, 1493 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (“During wartime, manufacturers similarly should not 
be overly cautious in the production and transportation of weapons, since delay may lead 
to missed strategic opportunities and deaths of American soldiers.”). Although the prima-
ry mission of Presidential’s troop airlift in McMahon was apparently to transport troops 
from one part of Afghanistan to another, the fact that the plane carried ammunition sug-
gests that it might fall within this Bentzlin dictum. See McMahon Appellate Brief, supra 
note 127, at 10–11 (describing munitions transportation). Defendants might draw support 
from Johnson in this regard. Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 1949) 
(noting that the delivery of weapons might qualify as “combatant activities” under the 
FTCA). 
 199. McMahon Appellate Brief, supra note 127, at 13 (“One of the risks that the mili-
tary and Presidential agreed to was to fly below the peaks of mountains in order to reduce 
risk of antiaircraft fire.”). 
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be combined in order to defeat the vicious cycle of violence. Soldiers and 
contractors have cooperated to combat insurgents, quell sectarian strife, 
rebuild the country, and defend against suicide bombers. To derail these 
efforts, insurgents have targeted civilian reconstruction workers,200 and 
as reconstruction contractors have been embroiled in violence, conven-
tional activities have taken on the characteristics of combatant activi-
ties.201 
                                                                                                                                     
 200. See Chia Lehnardt, Private Military Companies and State Responsibility, in FROM 
MERCENARIES TO MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 
139, 147–48 (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt eds., 2007) (“Contractors guarding 
reconstruction projects or escorting supply convoys through hostile territory are as much 
in the battlefield as [U.S.] troops. Even providing security for food delivery can result in 
being drawn into combat situations . . . . The distinction between security and military, 
defensive and offensive military operations appears, therefore, rather artificial.”) (cita-
tions omitted). According to a 2005 report of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Re-
construction, terrorist attacks caused 117 of the 147 U.S. civilian deaths (including con-
tractors’) since March 11, 2003. SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR IRAQ, REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 12 (2005). See also Daniel Bergner, The Other Army, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 
2005 (quoting General Jay Garner, former head of the Office of Reconstruction and Hu-
manitarian Assistance in Iraq (a precursor to the CPA), as saying that security contractors 
were “performing a military role”). 
 201. See LEXINGTON INST., CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD 12 (2007) (noting that 
contractors drove virtually all supply convoys in the early years of the Iraq war, and that 
“nearly every [Kellog, Brown & Root] convoy was attacked in one way or another”) 
(citing CHRISTIAN T. MILLER, BLOOD MONEY 137 (2006)); Robert F. Worth, Al Jazeera 
Shows Kidnapped U.S. Journalist, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2006 (“Insurgents attack Iraqi 
police and army forces almost daily, and foreign contractors are also frequent targets.”). 
Minow raises the point that regular activities may blur with combatant activities, query-
ing when one function “move[s] from civilian support to core military activity” and ob-
serving that the Defense Department has not adopted a policy on this matter. Minow, 
supra note 2, at 1015. See also FRED SCHREIER & MARINA CAPARINI, PRIVATIZING 
SECURITY: LAW, PRACTICE AND GOVERNANCE OF PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY 
COMPANIES 31 (2005) (“[I]n Iraq, insurgents ignore distinctions between security guards 
and combat troops. What is more, they have made convoys, headquarters, and buildings 
housing state authorities prime targets. As a result, security contractors have increasingly 
found themselves in pitched battles, supplying services which are difficult to distinguish 
from what soldiers of regular armed forces do.”). But see Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. 
Supp. 2d 10, 19 (D.D.C. 2005). In Ibrahim, the District Court for the District of Colum-
bia indicated that combatant-activities preemption might apply where the contractors 
were “essentially acting as soldiers.” Id. The court thus implicitly rejected the view that 
their mere presence in Iraq during the height of insurgency was sufficient to implicate the 
exception. See also The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 549 (1947) (noting 
that in view of army and judge advocate regulations, “combatant activities” has been 
construed narrowly). It is worth mentioning that the distinction between soldier and con-
tractor is not the only one being blurred. The nature of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, in 
which troops in the rear are as vulnerable to attack as troops on the frontline, has prompt-
ed commentators to reassess the U.S. prohibition on women’s service in certain combat 
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Admittedly, international law does not treat the military contractor as a 
“combatant” under the traditional meaning of the term.202 The drafters of 
the FTCA, however, could not foresee that contractors would serve in 
such a broad range of combat-support roles. Given the current situations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, the support that contractors provide is essential 
to military success. Filling in where the military lacks capability,203 con-
tractors have both augmented and replaced existing force capacity.204 As 
                                                                                                                                     
roles. See ELSEA & SERAFINO, supra note 1, at 5 (“Like soldiers, private security contrac-
tors incur the risk of death and injury from insurgents in Iraq.”); Valorie K. Vojdik, 
Beyond Stereotyping in Equal Protection Doctrine: Reframing the Exclusion of Women 
from Combat, 57 ALA. L. REV. 303, 331 n.272 (2005). 
 202. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
 203. DAVID ISENBERG, A FISTFUL OF CONTRACTORS: THE CASE FOR A PRAGMATIC 
ASSESSMENT OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES IN IRAQ 21 (2004) (noting that when the 
Army’s “technology-heavy 4th Infantry Division deployed to Iraq in 2003, about [sixty] 
contractors accompanied the division to operate its digital command and control sys-
tems,” which the Division did not yet know how to operate). 
 204. Peter Singer describes the contractor force as an “enabler,” adding that the war 
would not be possible without it. PETER SINGER, CAN’T WIN WITH ‘EM, CAN’T GO TO 
WAR WITHOUT ‘EM: PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND COUNTERINSURGENCY 3 
(2007). Singer’s argument is that without the presence of contractors, the U.S. govern-
ment could not engage the military in conflicts that garner the necessary public support, 
on account of the number of troops that would otherwise be required. Id. 
  For example, General Petraeus recently testified to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee that he considers contract security forces among the assets available to defeat 
the insurgency. Iraqi Reconstruction: Reliance on Private Military Contractors and Sta-
tus Report Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform 121, 125, 110th 
Cong. (2007) (statement of Andrew Howell, General Counsel of Blackwater USA). In 
Howell’s prepared remarks, he quoted U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, as 
saying, in response to the deaths of Blackwater security guards while protecting a U.S. 
diplomat, that “[t]hese five citizens were our colleagues and worked on behalf of the 
United States government to protect American diplomats and missions in Iraq.” Id. at 
123. Contractors have operated Predator drones and the guided missile defense system on 
the Navy’s ships, targeting precision weapons systems. SCHREIER & CAPARINI, supra note 
201, at 22. Although contractors ceased operating Predator drones during the war in Afg-
hanistan once they were mounted with hellfire missiles, contractors from Northrup 
Grumman operate Global Hawk surveillance drones. Boldt, supra note 18, at 507. Boldt 
adds that although not armed, “the operation of those drones could be of crucial impor-
tance for the outcome of battles, for example by locating fleeing targets in Afghanistan.” 
Id. See also Ian Traynor, The Privatization of War, GUARDIAN, Dec. 10, 2003, http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/world/2003/dec/10/politics.iraq/print (“When America launched its inva-
sion in March, the battleships in the Gulf were manned by [U.S. Navy] personnel. But 
alongside them sat civilians from four companies operating some of the world’s most 
sophisticated weapons systems.”). Following 9/11, contractors formed part of the earliest 
teams deployed in the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan to capture and/or kill 
Osama bin Laden. ROBERT YOUNG PELTON, LICENSED TO KILL 30–33, 42 (2006) (discuss-
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one report by the British House of Commons concluded, “The distinction 
between combat and non-combat operations is often artificial. The 
people who fly soldiers and equipment to the battlefield are as much a 
part of the military operation as those who do the shooting.”205 Thus, the 
delivery of necessary supplies to the front, or the operation or mainten-
ance of weapons systems is no less a combatant activity merely because 
a contractor performs it. Although the military’s field manual provides 
that contractors are not to engage in combat operations, contractors are 
performing functions that courts have characterized as “combatant activi-
ties.”206 The fact that a contractor is not technically a “combatant” under 
applicable international legal principles does not obscure the reality: 
theoretical distinctions no longer mirror the conditions of insurgent war-
fare and the critical role that contractors have played. 
B. Legislative Background and the (Non)Effect of Expanding Criminal 
Jurisdiction 
While the vast majority of the 160,000 military contractors currently 
operating in Iraq207 have performed satisfactorily, contractors have come 
under increasing scrutiny from the press and Congress as the U.S. mili-
tary interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have dragged on. Committees 
of the House of Representatives and Senate have held multiple hearings 
to address the challenges of regulating military contractors abroad.208 
                                                                                                                                     
ing the deployment of CIA contractor Bill Waugh and others to Afghanistan to hunt bin 
Laden, and contractors’ presence there between 2005 and 2006). 
 205. Minow, supra note 2, at 1015–16 (citing NINTH REPORT OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
COMM., PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES, SESSION 2001–2002, RESPONSE OF THE SECRE-
TARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH ACTIVITIES [Gr. Brit.] 4 (Oct. 2002)). 
See also CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD, supra note 201, at i (“[C]ontractors are now 
a de facto third force—a support force—integral to the conduct of modern warfare.”); 
Clayton Collins, War-Zone Security Is a Job for . . . Private Contractors?, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, May 3, 2004, http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0503/p02s01-usmi.html. One 
commentator suggests that “contractors are not replacing force structure, they are becom-
ing force structure.” DEBORAH C. KIDWELL, PUBLIC WAR, PRIVATE FIGHT? THE UNITED 
STATES AND PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 3 (2005). Contractors have even been 
awarded Purple Heart medals in some cases, though the government has more recently 
indicated that these would be rescinded. ISENBERG, supra note 203, at 74. 
 206. See Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2007) (finding that pris-
oner interrogation constituted a combatant activity). 
 207. SINGER, supra note 204, at 11 (noting the number of military contractors in Iraq in 
September 2007). 
 208. See, e.g., Enforcement of Federal Criminal Law to Protect Americans Working 
for U.S. Contractors in Iraq Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland 
Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007); War Profiteering and 
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Congress has also taken action to expand criminal accountability over 
contractors in Iraq. The reach of U.S. and Iraqi criminal laws over U.S. 
citizens serving as contractors in Iraq was initially thwarted by Coalition 
Provisional Authority (“CPA”) Order No. 17, which provided presump-
tive immunity from Iraqi law for all international private contractors op-
erating in Iraq.209 Order No. 17 did not preempt the law of the contrac-
tor’s sending state, but jurisdictional gaps complicated extending the 
reach of U.S. law over American contractors in Iraq.210 Congress has re-
cently acted to fill those gaps. 
The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (“MEJA”) broadens the 
scope of federal courts’ jurisdiction to punish certain classes of persons 
for acts committed abroad that would constitute crimes had they been 
committed in the United States.211 The statute in its original form permit-
ted prosecution of civilians under contract with the Department of De-
fense, but not with other agencies.212 Accordingly, the law did not cover 
many of the security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. Congress up-
dated the law in 2004 to apply to civilians who have contracted with any 
federal agency to the extent that the employment “relates to supporting 
the mission of the Department of Defense overseas.”213 Because the ser-
vice of most contractors in Iraq arguably supports the mission of the De-
partment of Defense, the 2004 revision of the MEJA might encompass 
the criminal conduct of nearly every contractor in Iraq or Afghanistan—
                                                                                                                                     
Other Contractor Crimes Committed Overseas Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terror-
ism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 209. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (Revised), Status of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority, MNF—Iraq, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq, CPA/ORD/27 
§ 4(3) (June 17, 2004). 
 210. Human rights groups have also attributed the lack of prosecutions to executive 
indifference. E.g., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS AT WAR: 
ENDING THE CULTURE OF IMPUNITY 19 (2008), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst. 
org/pubs/pubs.asp#privcon. This report points to the multitude of allegations of wrongful 
conduct by contractors, and the sparse prosecutions by the U.S. Department of Justice. Id. 
at 19–20. 
 211. Military Exterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2000). Howev-
er, the Military Exterritorial Jurisdiction Act only applies to contractors who are deemed 
to be supporting the mission of the Department of Defense. Id. § 3267(1)(A)(i)(II) (West 
2000 & Supp. 2007). Many contractors work for the State Department, not for the De-
partment of Defense. See Jed Babbin, Prosecution of Blackwater’s Raven 23 Begins, 65 
HUM. EVENTS 7 (2009); Del Quentin Wilber, Federal Judge Retains Charges Against 
Blackwater Guards, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2009. 
 212. 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a). 
 213. Id. § 3267(1)(A). 
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but this result is not clear.214 However, another amendment has passed 
the House215 (with equivalent legislation having been introduced in the 
Senate) that would apply the MEJA to all persons employed under con-
tract outside the United States, whether or not the contract supports the 
mission of the Department of Defense.216 In addition, the USA Patriot 
Act is potentially applicable to prosecute contractor crimes abroad; it has 
already been used to prosecute a military contractor for acts committed 
in Afghanistan.217 Certain abuses by contractors may also be prosecuted 
under the War Crimes Act and Torture Act.218 Finally, Congress ex-
panded the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) to cover con-
tractors supporting the military abroad.219 
Nonetheless, there have been few prosecutions of contractors in Iraq or 
Afghanistan. The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) enjoys wide discre-
tion.220 Although it has been inactive, the stage is set for the DOJ to play 
a more constructive role in monitoring contractors. Given the radical 
changes to the criminal-law landscape, might criminal prosecutions of 
contractors be sufficient to create the proper balance between deterring 
bad acts and incentivizing appropriate, bold action? Blackwater seems to 
think so. The company has argued that derivative sovereign immunity 
and combatant-activities preemption should protect it,221 while simulta-
                                                                                                                                     
 214. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 210, at 26 (“Human Rights First has con-
cluded that the current legal framework covers most criminal misconduct by most con-
tractors in Iraq and Afghanistan . . . .”). 
 215. 18 U.S.C. § 3261. 
 216. Security Contractor Accountability Act of 2007, S. 2147, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 217. Julian E. Barnes, Contractor Is Found Guilty of Assault That Killed Prisoner, 
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2006, at A18 (noting that “Passaro was charged under a provision 
of the Patriot Act that allows U.S. citizens accused of crimes at military installations to be 
prosecuted in U.S. federal courts”). 
 218. War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441(a) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(1) 
(2001). 
 219. The UCMJ formerly covered persons “serving with or accompanying an armed 
force in the field” during a time of war. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (1970). This proved prob-
lematic, as the president did not commence military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
pursuant to a congressional declaration of war. Accordingly, Congress revised the lan-
guage of the UCMJ such that it now applies during a “declared war or a contingency 
operation.” John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, §552, 
Pub. L. No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2083 (2006). Both the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan 
are, pursuant to Department of Defense designation, contingency operations. Sandra I. 
Irwin, Iraq Exodus: At Least Three Years, 93 NAT’L DEFENSE 12 (2008). 
 220. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“In our criminal justice 
system, the Government retains ‘broad discretion’ as to whom to prosecute.”). 
 221. See McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(Blackwater’s subsidiary, Presidential Airways, argued that it should benefit from deriva-
tive sovereign immunity and preemption rooted in the combatant-activities exception). 
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neously supporting increased criminal accountability. In his testimony 
before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
Chairman and CEO Erik Prince indicated in response to the prospect of a 
DOJ investigation of Blackwater’s actions that he would “welcome[,]. . . 
encourage[,] . . . [and] want that accountability . . . . We hold ourselves 
entirely accountable.”222 
In response to the spate of bad press, Blackwater and other private mil-
itary companies have trumpeted their adherence to criminal laws and the 
code of conduct promulgated by the trade association of which they are 
members.223 Contractors have an interest in playing by the rules: rule 
breaking is bad for business. It invites congressional scrutiny and jeopar-
dizes future contracts. But the industry’s self-regulation is no substitute 
for law. Indeed, even if the criminal prohibitions affecting contractors 
overseas were being enforced—and generally they are not224—criminal 
law is not an effective deterrent against a broad range of legally disfa-
vored acts.225 Tort law protects the public from a range of harms that are 
sufficiently serious to warrant the imposition of civil liability, though not 
deemed worthy of criminal punishment. Contractors should not be im-
mune from the reach of civil law merely because there is a net of crimi-
nal laws ready to ensnare them. That Congress has provided a statutory 
mechanism to curb the worst contractor abuses does not mean that states 
                                                                                                                                     
 222. Preliminary Transcript of Private Security Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong., 72 (2007) 
(statement of Erik Prince). 
 223. International Peace Operations Association, Code of Conduct, http://ipoaonline. 
org/php/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=205&Itemid=172 (last visited 
Dec. 5, 2008). The Code of Conduct states that member entities commit to adhering to 
human rights norms, the law of wars, and the rules of engagement. Id. It also provides 
that members must ensure transparency and accountability in their work. Id. 
 224. See 18 U.S.C. § 7(9) (2006); Mila Rosenthal, Letter to the Editor, Contractor 
Accountability, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007 (criticizing the lack of criminal prosecutions of 
the contractors involved in Abu Ghraib abuse); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
C.I.A. Contractor Indicted for Assaulting Detainee Held at U.S. Base in Afghanistan 
(June 17, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/June/04_crm_414.htm. 
 225. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (“The contention that 
an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or tran-
sient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom 
of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose 
between good and evil.”); Commonwealth v. Heck, 491 A.2d 212, 224 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1985) (“In a fundamental sense the harshness of criminal punishment is fitting only for 
these types of consciously inflicted wrongs, and so traditionally the criminal law has 
concerned itself exclusively with conscious wrongdoing.”); McElwain v. Georgia-Pacific 
Corp., 421 P.2d 957, 963 (Or. 1966) (distinguishing civil and criminal law by pointing to 
the fact that criminal law and the punitive damages of civil law, which service a criminal-
law-type deterrent function, are not intended to deter civil negligence). 
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have no interest in protecting against others. Holding an individual tort-
feasor accountable for the breach of a duty not only compensates victims 
who have suffered invasions of their legally recognized rights, but also 
serves as a deterrent to those who would act against them.226 
In summary, despite the arguments of companies like Blackwater, the 
potential for increased criminal accountability over military contractors 
in Iraq and Afghanistan does not obviate the need for an effective tort 
regime. Accepting combatant-activities preemption or derivative sove-
reign immunity on the grounds that criminal law protects against the 
threat of greater public injury is nonsensical. Can such preemption be 
justified, though, in the interest of furthering a federal interest? 
C. The Principles Underlying Combatant-Activities Preemption 
Courts are understandably cautious in preempting tort claims against 
contractors because preemption displaces “large chunks” of state law.227 
Nonetheless, courts have long recognized that in areas where state and 
federal legislative jurisdictions overlap, federal law may preempt state 
law where state law interferes with a federal interest.228 Even where a 
federal statute is silent as to its effect on state law, courts have found that 
certain areas “are so committed by the Constitution and laws of the Unit-
ed States to federal control that state law is preempted and replaced, 
where necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit 
statutory directive) by the courts—so-called ‘federal common law.’”229 
Although there is a presumption against preemption, courts may inter-
cede to prevent state law from interfering with the federal interest.230 In 
                                                                                                                                     
 226. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 794 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) 
(“Before any societal benefit can be derived from the deterrent effects of tort liability, 
however, the party in a position to correct the tortious act or omission must be held ac-
countable for the damages caused and thus motivated to prevent future torts.”); Roberts v. 
Williamson, 111 S.W.3d 113, 118 (Tex. 2003) (“The fundamental purposes of our tort 
system are to deter wrongful conduct, shift losses to responsible parties, and fairly com-
pensate deserving victims.”); Merten v. Nathan, 321 N.W.2d 173, 177 (Wis. 1982) (“Tort 
law also serves the ‘prophylactic’ purpose of preventing future harm; payment of damag-
es provides a strong incentive to prevent the occurrence of harm.”). See also DANIEL H. 
COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 212 (2005) (address-
ing how cost internalization will deter the commission of inefficient torts). 
 227. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors of 
Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 224 (1993); Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc., 913 
F.2d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that caution must be taken when conducting a 
preemption analysis). 
 228. Northern States Power Co. v. State, 447 F.2d 1143, 1145–46 (8th Cir. 1971). 
 229. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988). 
 230. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). Although the Court 
will generally find preemption in cases where it is explicitly written into a congressional 
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the case of civil liability for military service contractors, Congress has 
not passed any statute to immunize service contractors.231 Thus, before a 
court may preempt a tort claim against them, it must identify a unique 
federal interest warranting preemption. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in 
Koohi v. United States provides a starting point for considering the prin-
ciples underlying combatant-activities preemption. 
Koohi is the only case that discusses the policies underlying it.232 Ac-
cording to Koohi, there are two principles grounding the combatant-
activities exception.233 The first such principle is the federal interest in 
fostering bold action, such as direct attacks on the enemy.234 At first 
glance, this federal interest does not seem to be applicable to service con-
tractors, as the Department of Defense Federal Acquisitions Regulations 
(“DFARS”) specifically prohibits private military companies from en-
gaging in offensive combat operations.235 However, DFARS permits con-
                                                                                                                                     
statute, a statutory scheme may also impliedly preempt state law. See Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (asserting that Congress may preempt state law 
where Congress has evidenced an intent to displace a field or, even when it has not done 
so, there exists a conflict between state and federal law that stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of the congressional purpose). 
 231. Nor had Congress provided immunity for procurement contractors—prompting 
the Supreme Court in Boyle to develop the federal common-law-based government con-
tractor defense. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 500. 
 232. The Eleventh Circuit in McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc. deliberately 
avoided the issue. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1366 (11th 
Cir. 2007) (observing that combatant-activities preemption appears separate from Feres 
and declining to exercise discretion to entertain the appeal on this question). 
 233. See Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1334–35 (9th Cir. 1992). While the 
court applied these principles to preempt claims against the United States, it reasoned that 
they could extend equally to service contractors. Id. at 1336. The court in Bentzlin v. 
Hughes Aircraft Co. reaffirmed these principles, even where contractor negligence in-
jured U.S. service members, not “enemy” civilians as in Koohi. Bentzlin v. Hughes Air-
craft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486, 1494 (C.D. Cal. 1993). The Bentzlin court added to the 
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning on this last point: “nothing in the Koohi court’s decision sug-
gests that its reasoning was intended to be narrowly construed” so as to apply only to 
enemy civilians. Id. 
 234. Recall that the Koohi court applied combatant-activities preemption in favor of a 
weapons manufacturer, not a contractor performing services. Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1330. 
 235. 48 C.F.R. §§ 34.826–27 (noting that combat commanders cannot authorize con-
tractors to participate in “preemptive attacks, or any other types of attacks” and that civi-
lians accompanying the U.S. Armed Forces lose their protection under the laws of war 
“for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”); Id. § 16.764 (in discussing the 
difference between combat operations and self-defense, stating that “the rule does not 
authorize preemptive measures”); AIR FORCE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 21, at 1–2 (not-
ing that commanders must ensure that contactors not be assigned or allowed to perform 
“military combat activities” and that they are generally forbidden from using weapons in 
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tractors to use deadly force in self-defense or “when necessary to execute 
their security mission to protect assets/persons, consistent with the mis-
sion statement contained in their contract.”236 Given security contractors’ 
multifarious role in Iraq and Afghanistan—defending high-value targets, 
escorting convoys, or protecting the Baghdad airport, U.S. embassies, or 
CPA installations—and the conditions under which they operate, the op-
portunities for using deadly force in fulfillment of their missions are in-
numerable.237 Indeed, contractors could be characterized as participating 
directly in hostilities.238 Thus, although the choice to deploy contractors 
                                                                                                                                     
self-defense in case of attack). See also SCAHILL, supra note 20, at 129 (noting that a 
Blackwater official described his men as having been involved in “a security operation”). 
 236. 48 C.F.R. § 252.225-7040(b)(3)(ii). 
 237. See Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostili-
ties by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 511, 538 (2005) (“A 
civilian government employee or private contractor defending military personnel or mili-
tary objectives from enemy attack directly participates in hostilities. His or her actions are 
indistinguishable from the quintessential duties of combat personnel.”). 
 238. Jack M. Beard, The Geneva Boomerang: The Military Commissions Act of 2006 
and U.S. Counterterror Operations, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 56, 66–67 (2006) (citing U.S. 
Dep’t of Defense, Instruction 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany 
the U.S. Armed Forces, ¶ 6.3.5.2 (Oct. 3, 2005)); Goins, supra note 32, at 8. As to the 
importance of defensive action, one need only consider the well-publicized roles of ser-
vice contractors in defending two CPA installations against insurgent attack in 2005. In 
two separate incidents, contractors constituted the only line of defense to prevent CPA 
headquarters from being overrun by hundreds of Iraqi insurgents. The first took place in 
the Iraqi town of Najaf, where Moqtada al Sadr’s militiamen staged a frontal assault of 
the building, forcing the Blackwater contractors into an all-day firefight along with a 
handful of U.S. troops. PELTON, supra note 204, at 149–54. During the encounter, 
Blackwater contractors assumed command, shouting orders even to active-duty troops 
present on the scene. Id. at 150. Similarly, Hart Security along with members of other 
contractor outfits defended against insurgent attack a CPA post in the town of al Kut, 
suffering severe casualties before eventually pulling out under a ceasefire. Id. at 158–60. 
Najaf and al Kut are both towns in southern Iraq—Najaf (the holy Shiite city) to the 
south, and al Kut to the southeast. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 
Iraq Map, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/iz.html (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2009). 
  The Ukrainian coalition troops stationed nearby did little to assist while CPA 
headquarters all but ignored the incident at the time. See PELTON, supra note 204, at 145–
65; Jamie Wilson, Private Security Firms Call for More Firepower in Combat Zone: 
Coalition Forces Do Little to Help as Bodyguards Protecting Foreign Workers Are Tar-
geted by Deadly Insurgents, GUARDIAN, Apr. 17, 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/ 
2004/apr/17/iraq.jamiewilson (noting that Ukrainian troops helped to evacuate other 
buildings in al Kut, leaving Hart contractors to fend for themselves). Contractors have 
played similar defensive roles, generally to the exclusion of U.S. soldiers, in defending 
against attacks (real or hypothetical) on U.S. congressmen visiting Iraq, foreign politi-
cians such as Hamid Karzai, and even Paul Bremer. Craig S. Smith, Letters from Asia: 
The Intimidating Face of America, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2004 (describing DynCorp’s 
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on hazardous, but essential, security missions in lieu of U.S. forces is 
certainly debatable,239 once it has been made, the federal interest in en-
suring that such contractors take the appropriately bold protective steps 
in an emergency is beyond question. 
The second principle informing combatant-activities preemption is 
based in tort policy. According to Koohi, the punitive aspect of tort law 
makes it an inappropriate remedy against service members who negli-
gently injure others in combat240: the imperative to force U.S. soldiers to 
compensate persons injured by their negligence is reduced if one consid-
ers that scores of others are similarly injured by the inherently violent 
nature of war.241 The court’s second justification for preemption is ill-
conceived. Although tort law provides for punishment of the tortfeasor in 
certain cases, its primary function is to compensate the victim.242 In addi-
tion, the fact that some victims who suffer injuries in war are left without 
a remedy does not mean that others should be denied recourse.243 
                                                                                                                                     
protection of Afghan President Hamid Karzai). Karzai has been attacked several times. 
Id. 
 239. Among other objections, the challenge of integrating the military and civilian 
contractors creates a greater likelihood of friendly fire and other accidents. See William 
Spyro Speros, Note, Friend-of-a-Friendly Fire: A Future Tort Issue of Contractors on the 
Battlefield, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 297, 299–300 (2006). Speros discusses the likelihood of a 
friendly-fire incident involving military contractors, and notes that in military confronta-
tions friendly fire is inevitable. Id. (citing Charles R. Shrader, Friendly Fire: The Inevita-
ble Price, PARAMETERS, Autumn 1992, at 43). See also Michaels, supra note 2 (discuss-
ing the constitutional objections to substituting contractors for soldiers). 
 240. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1337 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 241. Id. The Ninth Circuit indicated that no duty of care existed in respect of “enemy 
civilians,” but is ambiguous as to whether a different result might obtain in cases of 
equipment malfunctions causing collateral damage among U.S. soldiers. Id. The Bentzlin 
court answered that question, finding that the exception foreclosed suit against the manu-
facturers of military equipment that malfunctioned and killed several Marines. Bentzlin v. 
Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486, 1494 (C.D. Cal. 1993). 
 242. See, e.g., Folz v. State, 797 P.2d 246, 261 (N.M. 1990) (“The whole theory of our 
tort law is to compensate the victim for his or her losses, not (unless punitive damages are 
awarded) to punish the tortfeasor.”). Punitive damages are generally not available for 
negligence. E.g., Grynberg v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 573 N.W.2d 493, 506 n.10 (S.D. 
1997). 
 243. Would the court’s statement imply that in the case of the National Security Agen-
cy wiretapping scandal, the fact that thousands of potential plaintiffs will not get their day 
in court for lack of standing also mean that those who can show standing should not be 
heard? See Tony Mauro, High Court Declines Review of NSA Wiretapping Program, 
LEGAL INTELLINGENCER, Feb. 21, 2008, at 4. 
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While it is unclear whether Koohi’s second rationale for preemption 
should apply to service contractors,244 the federal interest in encouraging 
bold, decisive action in the national defense should apply. Nevertheless, 
other federal interests may cut against preemption. The next Section dis-
cusses these countervailing interests. It highlights contractor discretion as 
the key element on which a court’s analysis should turn. Depending on 
the value a court sees in protecting a private military contractor’s acts of 
discretion, the combatant-activities defense might take on radically dif-
ferent proportions. 
D. Combatant-Activities Preemption: The Problem of Contractor Discre-
tion 
A soldier is entitled to immunity for actions taken in good faith in the 
scope of employment.245 Having substituted private employees for sol-
diers in key roles,246 it might be argued that the law should similarly pro-
tect contractors, especially since the prospect of civil liability for con-
                                                                                                                                     
 244. To the extent that the second principle justifies preemption of tort claims against 
procurement contractors (those who manufacture weapons in the safety of the home 
front), it applies a fortiori in the case of service contractors. Unlike procurement contrac-
tors, service contractors in a combat setting will act under conditions of exigency. Argua-
bly, were the Blackwater contractors who were involved in the defense of the government 
post in Najaf to have injured their U.S. Army or Marine counterparts by friendly fire, a 
reasonable person would find such conduct less deserving of punishment than the pro-
curement contractor who produces a fatally defective missile. Koohi’s reasoning would 
presumably apply in cases where contractors participate in combat activities but are not 
vulnerable to live fire. For example, contractors operated a guided missile system for the 
U.S. Navy in Iraq, while sixty contract employees were deployed with the Army’s 4th 
Infantry Division to operate its digital command and control systems. David Isenberg, A 
Government in Search of Cover: Private Military Companies in Iraq, in FROM 
MERCENARIES TO MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY 
COMPANIES, supra note 200, at 82, 85–88. 
 245. See In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 108–09 (D.D.C. 2007) 
(finding that officials accused of torture were potentially entitled to qualified immunity if 
the rights alleged to have been violated were not clearly established at the time of suit). 
Federal officials are also protected under the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1), which 
“affords federal employees absolute immunity from tort liability for negligent or wrong-
ful acts or omissions they commit while acting within the scope of their employment.” Id. 
at 110. 
 246. McMahon Motion to Dismiss, supra note 122, at 2–3 (arguing that identity as part 
of Total Force makes them akin to soldiers, requiring dismissal of claims). Service con-
tractors providing security services for key U.S. officials in Iraq may thus be distin-
guished from manufacturers of military equipment on the home front. The Supreme 
Court in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. indicated that the government-contractor 
defense would protect contractors only where they followed government orders. Boyle v. 
United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). 
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tractors may thwart effective decision making in risky circumstances.247 
Although proponents of such a defense might concede that the discretion 
of private, independent contractors is not worthy of protection at the ex-
pense of tort plaintiffs, they would maintain that their role in providing 
vital combat-support services changes the calculus. 
Nevertheless, a variety of factors weigh against protecting contractor 
discretion. First, the text of the FTCA suggests that the exception was 
intended to protect military decision making. Second, contractor discre-
tion does not deserve protection because unlike government employees, 
contractors are economic actors and will optimize their conduct even if 
immunity is unavailable. Third, under the principles of tort law, the con-
tractor is in the best position to avoid tortious behavior and thus immuni-
ty from negligence liability is inappropriate. Finally, the unique federal 
interest in combat situations is not applicable where the government 
lacks oversight and control. The incidents at Najaf and al Kut present 
cases in which private military contractors defended CPA positions with 
negligible outside aid.248 In certain cases, objective commentators have 
even characterized them as more reliable than the U.S. military or its 
coalition partners.249 It might seem unfair in such cases to refuse to pro-
                                                                                                                                     
 247. In his analysis of sovereign immunity, Peter Schuck has argued that because the 
law forces plaintiffs aggrieved by government action to seek redress against an individual 
federal employee rather than against the United States, it creates perverse and risk-
adverse effects. PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING THE GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR 
OFFICIAL WRONGS 75 (1983). For fear of liability, government officials substitute rela-
tively riskless action for appropriate action in order to minimize risk. Id. at 68–72. 
Schuck discusses these effects for “street-level officials,” not higher ranking individuals 
whose interactions with the public are more limited. Id. A “defect[] of official liability” is 
its “propensity to chill vigorous decisionmaking.” Id. at 100. Although Schuck’s attack is 
directed elsewhere, it is applicable in the case of service contractors. 
 248. In al Kut, Hart Security battled insurgents for fourteen hours before a cease-fire 
permitted them to evacuate. MILLER, supra note 201, at 165. See also supra note 238. 
 249. Having substituted contractors to protect top U.S. officials, the contractors are 
essentially acting as soldiers but do not benefit from similar legal protections. It is not for 
the courts to second-guess the inclusion of contractors in the mix. In combat conditions 
where critical U.S. interests are at stake, should the law recognize that contractors often 
function as soldiers?  
  Robert Young Pelton, who imbedded himself with Blackwater contractors for a 
month in Iraq in early 2004, describes the siege of al Kut. He reports that when word 
reached Paul Bremer that one of his CPA offices was on high alert he cautioned that 
whoever was sending the communications should “tone down” the wording. PELTON, 
supra note 204, at 156. Reviewing the inaction of the sizeable contingent of Ukrainian 
soldiers stationed near the office in response to the attack by Shiite militiamen, Pelton 
concludes that “[a]lthough the incidents in [a]n Najaf and [a]l Kut were downplayed by 
Bremer and never fully reported in the media, it was clear that Blackwater and other pri-
vate teams were a far better and more willing partner than many in the war in Iraq.” Id. at 
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tect contractors where the task they performed with pluck was manifestly 
one for the military. Yet, having considered the argument for protecting a 
contractor’s discretion in such circumstances, a variety of factors cut 
against such a result. These factors compel the conclusion that when a 
contractor is subject to civil liability for actions taken in a combat con-
text, even if the contractor retains significant discretion, combatant-
activities preemption is unwarranted. 
1. The Text of the FTCA 
The first objection to shielding security contractors for their discretio-
nary actions via combatant-activities preemption is the lack of a critical 
government nexus. The combatant-activities exception waives the gov-
ernment’s immunity except for claims “arising out of the combatant ac-
tivities of the military or naval forces.”250 Arguably, Congress intended 
the exception to apply only to the U.S. military. That the U.S. military 
uses contractors as an instrumentality of war in lieu of soldiers does not 
undermine the essential requirement that combatant-activities preemption 
serve to protect military decision making.251 Under the textual view, 
preemption is inappropriate because it does not protect a military deci-
sion per se; it would have no prophylactic effect on military decision 
making.252 
                                                                                                                                     
165. Similarly, Richard Dunn could not find an example of a combat support contractor 
abandoning its post in Iraq. RICHARD L. DUNN, CONTRACTORS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
“COMBAT ZONE” 34 (2005), available at http://www.acquisitionresearch.org/_files/FY 
2005/UMD-CM-05-020.pdf. He contrasts this record with a platoon of the Army Reserve 
Quartermaster Company, which refused to take its trucks on an assigned supply mission. 
Id. at 60 (citing John Lumpkin, Unit Refused Iraq Mission, Military Says, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Oct. 16, 2004). Gerald Schumacher also recounts an example in which Hart Secu-
rity was responsible for protecting a construction project, with the United Nations in 
charge of security for the area. GERALD SCHUMACHER, A BLOODY BUSINESS 167 (2006). 
As the security situation deteriorated, the United Nations departed, and Hart was left 
protecting the project. It ended up leaving one of its own dead behind when finally forced 
to evacuate. Id. See also ISENBERG, supra note 203, at 49 (noting that contractors have 
“largely stayed the course” rather than “walk[ed] away from the job . . . in the midst of 
combat”). 
 250. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2006). 
 251. Accounts from the battles suggest that Blackwater in Najaf and Hart Security in al 
Kut operated with virtually no military or CPA oversight. PELTON, supra note 204, at 
149–65. In fact, the CPA’s responses to Hart’s calls for aid largely consisted of admo-
nishments to “tone down” the wording of its communications. PELTON, supra note 204, at 
156. 
 252. See Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3–5 (D.D.C. 2007) (“It is the mili-
tary chain of command that the FTCA’s combatant activities exception serves to safe-
guard . . . . [C]ommon law claims against private contractors will be preempted only to 
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2. Incentivizing Contractor Conduct 
Congress and the courts have sheltered the discretion of federal em-
ployees from state tort liability by creating statutory and common-law 
immunity defenses.253 In determining the value of a contractor’s discre-
tionary act, it is useful to compare the government contractor to the gov-
ernment employee. In their analysis of the Supreme Court’s Boyle deci-
sion, Michael Green and Richard Matasar identify two salient differences 
between the two.254 Unlike the government officer, they argue, the gov-
ernment contractor is in a position to earn profits from its association 
with the government, and in a position to withdraw from the market for 
provision of security services.255 Because the contractor “stands to enjoy 
the benefits” of the contract, Green and Matasar suggest that a form of 
immunity is improper: “one would expect the contractor to engage in 
cost-benefit optimizing behavior without the benefit of immunity.”256 In 
contrast to public officers, who in theory act in the public interest and 
seek to maximize social welfare, private contractors “are assumed to 
maximize personal welfare, or profits, rather than public welfare, and to 
be staffed by self-interested individuals.”257 
There is evidence that this argument is applicable to military contrac-
tors because they stand to benefit personally from the contract and, as 
rational actors, have weighed the costs and benefits of assuming liability. 
The salary for private military contractors is much higher than the salary 
                                                                                                                                     
the extent necessary to insulate military decisions from state law regulation.”); Green & 
Matasar, supra note 77, at 652. To the extent that the law carves out an exception from 
the general waiver of sovereign immunity, it is only to protect military decisions, not 
those of nongovernmental actors. Id. 
 253. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1988) (providing that whenever an individual U.S. 
employee is sued in common law tort for acts committed within the scope of employ-
ment, the exclusive remedy is against the United States); Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 
292, 297–98 (1988) (holding that federal officials are absolutely immune from state tort-
law actions where conduct falls within the scope of official duties and is discretionary in 
nature). 
 254. Green & Matasar, supra note 77, at 652–53. Green and Matasar distinguish the 
two on a variety of grounds, only two of which are discussed above. 
 255. Id. at 652–53, 717. 
 256. Id. at 652–53. 
 257. See SCHREIER & CAPARINI, supra note 201, at 51 (“[P]olitical and military ex-
igencies do not naturally combine with the economic motivations of PMCs . . . .”); Ro-
nald A. Cass & Clayton P. Gillette, The Government Contractor Defense: Contractual 
Allocation of Public Risk, 77 VA. L. REV. 257, 273 (1991); Schooner, supra note 36, at 
565 (“[T]he pursuit of fees distorts the moral compass that we would otherwise hope to 
animate federal government procurement officials.”). 
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for regular members of the U.S. military.258 Moreover, applicable provi-
sions of DFARS specifically state that a contractor must accept all risks 
associated with supporting the military abroad, and that all liability in 
connection with a contractor’s use of a weapon rests solely with the con-
tractor.259 Indeed, in response to a comment to its proposed rule that 
Boyle does not apply to service contractors and that contractors may be 
liable for their torts, the Department of Defense stated in a recent revi-
sion of DFARS that 
[t]he public policy rationale behind Boyle does not apply when a  
performance-based statement of work is used in a services contract, be-
cause the Government does not, in fact, exercise specific control over 
the actions and decisions of the contractor or its employees or subcon-
tractors. . . . [T]o the extent that contractors are currently seeking to 
avoid accountability to third parties for their own actions by raising de-
fenses based on the sovereignty of the United States, this rule should 
not send a signal that would invite courts to shift the risk of loss to in-
nocent third parties. The language in the clause is intended to encour-
age contractors to properly assess the risks involved and take proper 
precautions.260 
Faced with such an explicit contractual and regulatory ex ante alloca-
tion of risk, the contractor has logically built the cost of potential tort 
liability into its rates. Even if this is not the case for all contractors, the 
law should presume it.261 Therefore, immunity for contractors would be 
redundant. 
                                                                                                                                     
 258. T. Christian Miller, Arrested Contractors Allege Abuse by Marines, S. FLA. SUN-
SENTINEL, June 12, 2005, at 15A (“Private contractors routinely make three or four times 
the salary that U.S. soldiers do, upward of $100,000 a year.”). 
 259. 48 C.F.R. § 252.225-7040(b)(2), (j)(4) (2008). 
 260. Id. § 252.225-7040(b)(2). Although military regulations may provide that the 
military does not exercise control over contractors, the facts on the ground, as courts have 
justifiably found, may dictate a different answer. See supra Part III. 
 261. For example, when considering defenses of commercial impracticability, frustra-
tion, and force majeure in contract law, courts will generally interpret the contract to 
allocate risk to the party that could have most efficiently foreseen the cause of the im-
practicability or frustration and have taken measures to guard against it. See, e.g., Spar-
tech Corp. v. Opper, 890 F.2d 949, 955 (7th Cir. 1989) (“A principle purpose of contracts 
. . . is to allocate the risk of the unexpected[,] . . . not to place it always on the promi-
see.”); N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 275–79 (7th Cir. 
1986) (describing doctrines of frustration as “doctrines for shifting risk to the party better 
able to bear it, either because he is in a better position to prevent the risk from materializ-
ing or because he can better reduce the disutility of the risk (as by insuring) if the risk 
does occur”). In that case, a court uses default norms to assign liability, deciding the issue 
of risk allocation in a manner akin to how the parties would have decided it had they 
considered the question. 
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It may be argued that failing to provide service contractors with an af-
firmative defense will increase the cost of liability so much that contrac-
tors will withdraw from the market of providing military services. How-
ever, given the critical role contractors have played in Iraq and Afghanis-
tan, their withdrawal from combat-support services is unlikely. First, 
contractors entered the market to provide military services with no clear-
ly established affirmative defense on which to rely. Therefore, a court’s 
refusal to create an affirmative defense should not measurably affect the 
behavior of contractors in this market. Second, if a contractor receives an 
adverse jury award for tort liability, it can raise the rates it charges the 
federal government for its military services. Admittedly, the Supreme 
Court in Boyle recognized a federal interest in avoiding such a result,262 
but courts should not treat the impact on the federal treasury as a justifi-
cation for preempting tort claims against contractors.263 Green and Mata-
sar point out that “[p]rotection of the federal fisc is a virtually unmana-
geable justification” for the government-contractor defense, noting that 
almost every case touching on federal law has a potential impact on the 
“monetary interests of the United States.”264 They identify a number of 
cases in which courts have refused to employ federal common law to 
assuage the impact of a tort judgment on the federal treasury.265 As Jus-
tice Brennan’s dissent in Boyle observes, the Supreme Court has declined 
to create a federal common law rule displacing state law where litigation 
between private parties would have the effect of raising contract prices 
for the government.266 The Boyle majority recognized that pass-through 
costs are not alone sufficient to justify preemption.267 
                                                                                                                                     
 262. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988). 
 263. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae, Professional Services Council and International 
Peace Operations Ass’n at *14, Nordan v. Blackwater Security Consulting, LLC (In re 
Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC), 460 F.3d 576 (4th Cir. 2005) (arguing that permitting 
a remedy, in addition to that of the Defense Base Act, against a contractor in a suit 
brought by employees threatens to burden the federal government by imposing higher 
costs on the government). 
 264. Green & Matasar, supra note 77, at 663. 
 265. Id. (citing United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954); United States v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947)). 
 266. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 519–22 (Brenan, J., dissenting) (citing Miree v. DeKalb 
County, 433 U.S. 25, 27 (1977); Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 69 
(1966)). See also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 521 (1988); James v. Dravo 
Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 160 (1937) (The fact that a tax on a government contrac-
tor “may increase the cost to the government . . . would not invalidate the tax.”). 
 267. Green & Matasar, supra note 77, at 664 (citing Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510–11). The 
Supreme Court identified protecting the discretionary judgments of the government about 
military designs and specifications as the primary justification for the government-
contractor defense. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512. 
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The factual circumstances the Supreme Court addressed in Boyle differ 
fundamentally from those confronting the provider of security services in 
Iraq or Afghanistan. The Court in Boyle stated that fashioning a federal 
common law affirmative defense would be appropriate in situations 
where the contractor could not comply with its contractual obligations 
and the applicable duty of care under state law.268 Boyle concerned a 
contractor that breached its duty of care in crafting the manufacturing 
specifications for a product.269 Because Boyle speaks to the case in which 
the government effectively allows the contractor to violate the duty of 
care, a tort suit is a virtual guarantee. Accordingly, the threat of tort lia-
bility, including the threat to the federal fisc, for contracts meeting the 
Boyle test is much greater than for service contracts. 
The relevant service contracts contain no hint that a military contractor 
in Iraq or Afghanistan cannot simultaneously discharge its contractual 
responsibilities and act with the appropriate duty of care.270 Section 
252.225 of DFARS permits contractors to use deadly force in “self-
defense” and when “necessary to execute their security mission to protect 
assets/persons, consistent with the mission statement contained in their 
contract.”271 The regulatory language does not oblige a contractor to 
breach applicable duties. By sanctioning the use of such force in a broad-
er context, the regulations allow contractors to accomplish their contrac-
tual missions even in difficult circumstances. These regulations will not 
per se absolve a contractor of liability for breaching the standard of care. 
They help define that duty. And in any event, they empower the contrac-
                                                                                                                                     
 268. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 509 (“If, for example, the United States contracts for the pur-
chase and installation of an air-conditioning unit, specifying the cooling capacity but not 
the precise manner of construction, a state law imposing upon the manufacturer of such 
units a duty of care to include a certain safety feature would not be a duty identical to 
anything promised the Government, but neither would it be contrary. The contractor 
could comply with both its contractual obligations and the state-prescribed duty of care. 
No one suggests that state law would generally be pre-empted in this context.”). See also 
Adams v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 700, 707 (W.D. Va. 2002) (distin-
guishing the facts of the case from Boyle and finding that the contractor was not entitled 
to governmental immunity on grounds that the duty of care owed under state law did not 
“conflict[] with or even burden[]” contractual or regulatory duties). 
 269. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 509 (“Here the state-imposed duty of care that is the asserted 
basis of the contractor’s liability (specifically, the duty to equip helicopters with the sort 
of escape-hatch mechanism petitioner claims was necessary) is precisely contrary to the 
duty imposed by the Government contract (the duty to manufacture and deliver helicop-
ters with the sort of escape-hatch mechanism shown by the specifications).”). 
 270. See, e.g., Contract Between Department of Defense and CACI Premier Technology, 
Inc., available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow/resources.aspx?act=resources (go-
verning the provision of interrogation services from 2003 to 2004). 
 271. 48 C.F.R. § 252.225(b)(3)(iii) (2008). 
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tor to act decisively without fear of losing its current or future contracts, 
and provide some incentive to act aggressively without fear of tort lia-
bility. In cases of exigency, where self-defense is appropriate, the con-
tractor is held to a comparatively lower standard of care,272 giving the 
reasonable person wider latitude for error. For example, a contractor will 
not be liable in tort to a bystander whom he or she accidentally injures 
while exercising his or her right to self-defense.273 In summary, the threat 
to the federal treasury is not as acute in the case of service contractors 
because, in contrast to contractors who might qualify for protection un-
der the Boyle factors, they will more often be able to comply with the 
applicable standard of care. 
A court should step in to override state law only when there is a threat 
of “major damage” to “clear and substantial” federal interests.274 The 
previous discussion of the principles animating the Koohi decision de-
monstrates that the federal government has an interest in motivating con-
tractors to act boldly and decisively to protect U.S. interests.275 However, 
on further reflection, it is unclear that combatant-activities preemption is 
necessary to effectuate these interests. Unlike government employees, 
who act in the public interest, military service contractors personally 
benefit from their contract and have weighed the costs and benefits of 
assuming liability. Moreover, mass contractor withdrawal from the mili-
tary services market is unlikely, and the threat of injury to the federal 
treasury associated with higher rates is an insufficient reason to protect 
the discretion of service contractors. Because they may fulfill their con-
tractual obligations without breaching the applicable standard of care, 
                                                                                                                                     
 272. Although the standard of care, that of a “reasonable person,” does not change, 
society’s expectation about how a reasonable person would act in a given set of circums-
tances does. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 302 (2000). See also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 75 cmt. b, illus. 1 (2006) (“In determining whether the actor as a 
reasonable man should be aware that his act creates an unreasonable risk of causing an 
invasion of any of the third person’s interests of personality . . . [t]he exigency in which 
the actor is placed, though not due to the third person’s conduct, with its attendant neces-
sity of an almost instantaneous choice of a means of self-defense, is here a factor of great 
importance.”). The concept of the reasonable actor necessarily changes in a combat situa-
tion. See Mark J. Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline and the Law of 
War, 86 CAL. L. REV. 939, 959 (1998) (“The capacity of the human mind to process com-
plex information in situations of extreme adversity, such as those on the battlefield, is 
quite limited.”). 
 273. DOBBS, supra note 272, at 159, 169–70. 
 274. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966). 
 275. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1337 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[O]ne purpose of 
the combatant activities exception is to recognize that during wartime encounters no duty 
of reasonable care is owed to those against whom force is directed as a result of autho-
rized military action.”). 
2009] SUING THE HIRED GUNS 447 
preemption is unwarranted in these situations Thus, it is doubtful that 
preemption is necessary to incentivize service contractors to take bold, 
decisive action in combat zones. 
3. Efficiency, Equity, and Indemnification 
In its preemption analysis, a court should also consider questions of 
economic efficiency and equity,276 which suggest that contractors should 
not be protected where they act as functionally autonomous actors.277 A 
core principle of modern tort law is that liability for negligence should be 
borne by the party that is the cheapest cost avoider.278 In other words, 
liability is efficient where the burden of precaution is less than the prob-
ability of the harm times the magnitude of the harm.279 As between a 
U.S. soldier and an Iraqi or Afghan civilian, the contractor is in the better 
position to evaluate the likelihood and magnitude of the harm. This is 
because a security contractor may discharge his or her contractual re-
sponsibilities in conformity with the applicable duty of care. The con-
tractor is also able, and in many cases will be required, to purchase in-
surance in connection with his or her performance of a military con-
tract.280 Thus, in this situation, the service contractor should be the party 
responsible for insuring against the risk and bearing the cost of any re-
sulting harm.281 
                                                                                                                                     
 276. Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42, 176 (Mo. 1988) (“Cognate principles of 
equity and economic efficiency also inform” the goals of compensation and deterrence in 
tort law.). 
 277. The military contractor in Iraq and Afghanistan will never be fully autonomous, 
of course, as he or she is subject to the terms of the contract, as well as default statutory 
and administrative rules. 
 278. Rankin v. City of Wichita Falls, 762 F.2d 444, 448 (5th Cir. 1985); Elam, 765 
S.W.2d at 176 (“[C]osts of the pervasive injury which result from mass exposure to toxic 
chemicals shall be borne by those who can control the danger and make equitable distri-
bution of the losses, rather than by those who are powerless to protect themselves.”). 
 279. See Mesman v. Crane Pro Servs., 409 F.3d 846, 850 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The cheap-
er the precaution, the greater the risk of accident, and the greater the harm caused by the 
accident, the likelier it is that the failure to take the precaution was negligent.”). For a 
description of the Hand test, developed by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Car-
roll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947), see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 168 (2007). Posner engages in extensive criticism and reformulation of 
the traditional Hand test. Id. 
 280. 48 C.F.R. § 52.228-7 (2007) (requiring a contractor to carry some minimum 
amount of general liability insurance.) 
 281. Steven L. Schooner & Erin Siuda-Pfeffer, Post-Katrina Reconstruction Liability: 
Exposing the Inferior Risk-Bearer, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 287, 310 (2006) (citing Richard 
A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfeld, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract 
Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 90–92 (1977)).  
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Against this backdrop, the effect of providing a federal common law 
affirmative defense for service contractors in this situation would shift 
the loss to the innocent victim. A defense intended to protect contractor 
discretion is unjustifiable because the contractor is in the better position 
to avoid the loss in the first place, and because the national security in-
terest in incentivizing risk taking is not present.282 If the government had 
considered ensuring that contractors act with fearless discretion in com-
bat scenarios to be sufficiently important to national securities interests, 
it would have indemnified these contractors. When Congress has deter-
mined that such a strong interest exists, it has not been hesitant to pro-
vide legislative solutions. The same is true for the executive. 
Congress has authorized indemnification in cases where it “was neces-
sary to encourage contractors to undertake activities for the government 
[that] would expose them to greater risks than would ordinary commer-
cial or industrial activities, which could be protected by private insur-
ance.”283 Under the authority of the National Defense Contracts Act,284 in 
conjunction with Executive Order 10,789,285 the president may authorize 
the Department of Defense to modify a contract, which includes provid-
ing for indemnification, whenever such action would facilitate the na-
tional defense. Contractual indemnification may apply to losses not com-
pensable by insurance, including litigation and settlement fees.286 Subject 
to restrictions, contractors may also obtain indemnification under exist-
ing federal acquisition regulations for defined liabilities not covered by 
insurance, including loss or damage to property, and death or bodily in-
jury.287 The post-9/11 legal landscape demonstrates that Congress can act 
                                                                                                                                     
 282. See, e.g., Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113, 119 (La. 1974) (“[A]s between him 
who created the risk of harm and the innocent victim thereby injured, the risk-creator 
should bear the loss.”). 
 283. Frank P. Grad, Contractual Indemnification of Government Contractors, 4 
ADMIN. L.J. 433, 443–44 (1991). 
 284. 50 U.S.C. § 1431 (2007). See Kevin P. Mullen, Extraordinary Contractual Relief: 
Public Law 85-804 in the Homeland Security Era, 37 PROCUREMENT LAW. (2002). 
 285. Exec. Order No. 10,789, 3 C.F.R 426–27 (1954–1958), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 
1431 (2007). 
 286. Id. 
 287. 48 C.F.R. § 52.228-7 (2007). See AIR FORCE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 21, at 9–
10. Reimbursement under this section is “subject to the availability of appropriated funds 
at the time the liability arises,” and is available for cost-reimbursement contractors, not in 
fixed-price contracts. Agnes P. Dover & Thomas L. McGovern III, Risk Mitigation Ap-
proaches for Government Contractors, BRIEFING PAPERS 4 (2007). Although the Anti-
Deficiency Act places restrictions on the government’s ability to commit to undefined 
contingent liabilities, defined indemnification efforts are permissible. 31 U.S.C. § 1341 
(2007). See also Assumption by Government of Contractor Liability to Third Persons—
Reconsideration, 62 Comp. Gen. 361 (1983), at *9–10 (LEXIS). The National Defense 
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quickly when it wants to,288 and Congress is in the best position to strike 
a balance between the states’ interest in enforcing their tort laws and the 
federal interest in protecting military service contractors.289 
                                                                                                                                     
Contracts Act is an exception to the prohibition on open-ended indemnification agree-
ments. Dover & McGovern, supra note 284, at 2. In fact, industry groups have lobbied 
for third-party indemnification under FAR § 52.228-7, Insurance—Liability to Third 
Persons, for fixed-price contracts. Bar Group Identifies Barriers to Contractor Support of 
Defense Missions, 47 No. 39 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 439, Oct. 19, 2005 (noting that the 
Professional Services Council, an industry group for private contractors such as Blackwa-
ter and others, had pushed for the expansion of the regulation). 
 288. Congress has passed a number of bills extending various forms of immunity to 
industries that perform functions deemed vital to homeland security. See, e.g., Support 
Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §§ 441–444 
(2006) (protecting manufacturers of qualified antiterrorism technology by creating a re-
buttable presumption for the government-contractor defense); Public Readiness and 
Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d, 247d-6e (2005) (shielding 
manufacturers and distributors of a “covered countermeasure” protecting the public 
health during times of a declared pandemic or other health emergency); Smallpox Emer-
gency Personnel Act, 42 U.S.C. § 239 (2002) (protecting manufacturers and distributors 
of the smallpox vaccine in a designated time of emergency by substituting the United 
States as a defendant in personal injury claims). 
  To the extent that legislation only reaches contractors who manufacture products, 
consider the proposed Gulf Coast Recovery Act (“GCRA”). Gulf Coast Recovery Act, S. 
1761, 109th Cong. (2005). Senator Jim Thune (South Dakota) sponsored the legislation, 
with senators James Inhofe (Oklahoma), Trent Lott (Mississippi), Lisa Murkowski (Ar-
kansas), and David Vitter (Louisiana) as cosponsors. The bill seeks to clarify (and re-
duce) the liability of contractors participating in the reconstruction of areas affected by 
Hurricane Katrina. If the Army Corps of Engineers certifies the contractor, in the event of 
a lawsuit, the GCRA entitles the contractor to a “rebuttable presumption” that the ele-
ments of the government-contractor defense were satisfied. Id. §§ 5(d)(1)–(2). See also 
Schooner & Siuda-Pfeffer, supra note 281, at 301–03. By deploying contractors presump-
tively shielded by the government-contractor defense, the government would effectively 
place beyond a plaintiff’s challenge a range of acts of contractor discretion. Id. at 304 (In 
the context of emergency contracting, “the government essentially delegates any exercise 
of discretion to contractors” and “[s]uch open ended arrangements fail to provide the 
specific direction or approval historically required for application of the government 
contractor defense.”). See also Mark Gleason, Note, In the Name of Boyle: Congress’s 
Overexpansion of the Government Contractor Defense, 36 PUB. CONT. L.J. 249 (2007) 
(arguing that the GRCA does not honor the limitations of the government contractor de-
fense). The GCRA is flawed legislation. It radically overextends the government-
contractor defense without the necessary safeguards to prevent abuses. Fortunately it is 
not yet law. The GCRA demonstrates that Congress, if it saw fit, could act to protect 
service contractors in narrow circumstances where commercial insurance is unavailable. 
Schooner & Siuda-Pfeffer, supra note 281, at 321 (observing that Congress has typically 
indemnified contractors when insurance has been unavailable). Insurance for contractors 
that operate in and around the battlefield may be unavailable in many cases. See Goins, 
supra note 32, at 17, 22 (noting that insurance may be denied where a contractor carries 
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4. Government Oversight and Control 
The United States also has a strong federal interest in ensuring the ap-
propriate integration of and control over private military companies. It 
goes without saying that a unique federal interest exists in ensuring mili-
tary effectiveness. This interest bears on government accountability and 
should also figure into a court’s determination as to whether preemption 
is warranted with respect to service contractors. First, current military 
doctrine290 presupposes that to form an effective component of the armed 
forces’ Total Force, contractors must be incorporated into the military’s 
command and control structures.291 Second, particularly in Iraq, the lack 
of government control over contractors has lowered foreign confidence 
in the United States and its mission.292 
                                                                                                                                     
weapons or is engaged in a high-risk activity, or where there is a high risk of loss from 
terrorist activities). 
 289. Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 895, 962–63 
(1996) (“[I]t is hard to escape the conclusion that the Court exercised power that the Con-
stitution reserves to Congress.”). 
 290. For example, the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review emphasizes the impor-
tance of integration. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 81 
(2006), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf [herei-
nafter QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REPORT]. The 2004 National Military Strategy provides 
that attaining the military’s goals for deploying its forces in combat zones requires “a 
seamless mix of active forces, the Reserve component, [Department of Defense] civi-
lians, and contracted work force.” Colonel Ronda G. Urey, Civilian Contractors on the 
Battlefield 1 (Mar. 18, 2005) (unpublished thesis, U.S. Army War College) (on file with 
the Brooklyn Journal of International Law) (citing RICHARD B. MYERS, NATIONAL 
MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2004)). 
 291. See JOSEPH J. BUTKUS & MATTHEW F. HOWES, A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF  
THE COORDINATION, COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ 18 (2006), avail-
able at http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=A 
DA460387 (“Conflicts between contractors and military commanders have caused dis-
ruptions in services, breaches in security and increased costs to the government.”); 
KIDWELL, supra note 205, at 45 (“The integration of PMCs as a greater percentage of the 
force mix can directly impact military capabilities.”).  
 292. The hostility of the U.S. intervention has produced violent terrorist backlashes 
and an indigenous anti-American terrorist movement. Peter Bergen & Paul Cruickshank, 
The Iraq Effect: The War in Iraq and Its Impact on the War on Terrorism, MOTHER 
JONES, Feb. 21, 2007, available at http://www.motherjones.com/print/17073. These, in 
turn, have required that the United State maintain unexpectedly high troop levels, sacri-
fice over 4000 military lives, and delay the establishment of functional and stable democ-
racy. STEVE BOWMAN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, IRAQ: U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS 
AND COSTS 2 (2004), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/41127.pdf. The prob-
lems are less egregious in Afghanistan—where neglect rather than cultural insensitivity 
and poor planning is to blame for our lack of progress—but similar issues threaten the 
country. Nathaniel C. Fick & John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanis-
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Integrating contractors with the military has been a challenge for the 
U.S. military for over 200 years.293 Indeed, the value of the contractor as 
a force multiplier assumes that there are structures in place that allow 
combatant commanders to augment active duty forces without sacrificing 
overall efficiency.294 While full assimilation of contractors into the for-
                                                                                                                                     
tan Edition, FOREIGN POL’Y, Jan. 2009, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/ 
cms/php?story_id=4587. 
 293. John Calhoun, as Secretary of War, complained of the problem in 1818. BUTKUS, 
supra note at 291, at 18 (describing the challenge of the “integration of civilian contrac-
tors within a rigid military chain of command”). Modern military doctrine emphasizes 
integrating contractors into the Total Force. 
 294. SCHREIER & CAPARINI, supra note 201, at 47 (“Maintaining visibility of contrac-
tors and coordinating their movements are vital if the commander is to manage his avail-
able assets and capabilities efficiently and effectively.”). See also Urey, supra note 290, 
at 7 (noting that according to relevant military doctrines, “[c]ontracted support must be 
integrated into the overall support plan”); Colonel George G. Akin, Joint Implications for 
Contracted Logistics (Mar. 30, 2007) (unpublished thesis, U.S. Army War College) (on 
file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law) (“To fight as a joint team the comba-
tant commander must force synchronization and standardization of contractor operations 
across Service components . . . to optimize contractors support.”). Apart from the tactical 
and efficiency losses from the failure to effectively integrate contractors with active and 
reserve forces, such failure has caused myriad friendly-fire incidents that have taken the 
lives of scores of contractors and soldiers alike. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO NO. 05-737, REBUILDING IRAQ: ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE USE OF PRIVATE 
SECURITY PROVIDERS 27 (2005); DOD FORCE MIX ISSUES: GREATER RELIANCE ON 
CIVILIANS IN SUPPORT ROLES COULD PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT BENEFITS 10 (1994) (describ-
ing incidences of friendly fire between contractors and military, and noting that they oc-
cur primarily at military checkpoints, and that between January and May 2005, twenty 
reports of friendly fire were received). The Bush administration took steps to address 
coordination problems, subjecting all security firms contracting with the State Depart-
ment to the supervision and control of the Department of Defense. See John M. Broder & 
David Johnston, U.S. Military Will Supervise Security Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2007. 
  U.S. emphasis on contractor integration finds a parallel in the approach of the 
United Kingdom, which has forcefully privatized combat-support functions. A funda-
mental assumption of U.K. military doctrine is that contractors can be integrated with 
regular military forces. See MATTHEW UTTLEY, CONTRACTORS ON DEPLOYED MILITARY 
OPERATIONS: UNITED KINGDOM POLICY AND DOCTRINE 15 (2005) (describing the United 
Kingdom’s assumptions underlying the privatization of military operations, including that 
“[c]ontractors providing deployed support can be integrated into military operational 
planning, and command and control . . . arrangements without disruption.”). The Royal 
Military has taken a further step towards integration through the development of the 
“Sponsored Reserves”; the military draws on members of a contractor’s staff who qualify 
as reservists, and these members perform functions appropriate for contractors during 
peacetime but inappropriate during war. See Matthew R.H. Uttley, Private Contractors 
on Deployed Operations: The United Kingdom Experience, 4 DEF. STUD. 145, 160 (2004). 
The Sponsored Reserves are deployed to perform contractor functions, but are subject to 
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mal military chain of command is not likely to be achieved, the value of 
contractors as a force multiplier will be defeated if they are involved in 
combat-support roles that operate wholly independently from military 
command.295 Functioning as a parallel force decreases contractors’ effec-
tiveness, undermining the value of their presence in the combat zone.296 
Coordination and communication between contractors and the military 
increases the overall effectiveness of the civil-military effort.297 Since the 
true value of the private military contractor in a combat zone is derived 
from the appropriate coordination and integration of contractors with 
regular forces, protecting the independent discretion of contractors does 
little to further the critical federal interest in integrating the military.298 
Contractor accountability also matters in the crucial battle for the 
“hearts and minds” of the citizens of Iraq and Afghanistan. Contractors 
are essential to the war effort, and most have acted honorably. But their 
aggressive tactics and lawless behavior have caused them to be “one of 
the most visible and hated aspects of the American presence in Iraq.”299 
Accountability is crucial where the aim of the counterinsurgency is to 
create a vested interest in the success of democracy, an effort that de-
pends on persuading Iraqis and Afghans to support the invasion.300 Ob-
servers agree that the culture of impunity among contractors has severely 
damaged the U.S. war effort, particularly in Iraq.301 If courts preempt tort 
                                                                                                                                     
the command and control of the military. Id. As such, their identities as contractors and 
soldiers are deliberately intertwined to ensure maximum effectiveness. Id. 
 295. See Joe A. Fortner, Institutionalizing Contractor Support on the Battlefield, 32 
ARMY LOGISTICIAN 12 (2000) (noting that one of the basic principles of contractor sup-
port is that “[it] must be integrated into the overall support plan”). 
 296. For example, soldiers and contractors are vulnerable to friendly fire and other 
accidents when the two forces function independently. See MILLER, supra note 201, at 
168 (describing the prevalence and incidences of friendly fire between the military and 
contractors). 
 297. See SCHUMACHER, supra note 249, at 52.  
 298. As can be imagined from the Johnson case, a contractor may participate in a 
“combatant activity” while functionally integrated in a civilian agency, such as the FAA, 
Department of the Interior, or State Department. See Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 
767, 770 (9th Cir. 1948). 
 299. SINGER, supra note 204, at 5. See also id. at 9 (“Contractors have proven to be a 
drag on efforts to explain the highly unpopular U.S. effort in Iraq . . . .”). But see 
SCHUMACHER, supra note 249, at 170 (noting that one of the tasks of security contractors 
in Iraq is to intimidate). 
 300. See Evan Thomas & John Berry, The Fight over How to Fight, NEWSWK., Mar. 
24, 2008 (explaining how theorists of war in a “world of failing states” argue that “fire-
power is not enough,” that “it is necessary to win hearts and minds”). 
 301. There is no serious disagreement among scholars that the United States fostered 
such a culture. For example, CPA Order 17 provided that Iraqi law would be inapplicable 
to contractors. The CPA was unable to account for ten percent of contractor staff at one 
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suits in cases where contractors are acting with measured discretion, it 
will add to the debilitating culture of impunity that has undermined U.S. 
military and civil efforts in Iraq from the beginning. 
E. Effective Control: A Case for Limited Combatant-Activities Preemp-
tion 
This Article has argued that unique federal interests are absent in civil 
negligence claims arising from the discretionary acts of contractors. 
However, it has not yet addressed whether a preemption defense might 
be appropriate in other circumstances. This Section answers this question 
in the affirmative. It first examines a threshold question—how should a 
court evaluate whether preemption is appropriate when the government 
exercises considerable control over contractors? This Section then re-
views the various judicial doctrines that seek to insulate military decision 
making from scrutiny and concludes that combatant-activities preemp-
tion may be justified under these doctrines. Although the scope of 
preemption should be narrow, it may be invoked in circumstances where 
the contractor is under the direct supervision and control of the govern-
ment.302 
                                                                                                                                     
point in the war, and the government outsourced the contractor monitoring function to a 
contractor. See Isenberg, supra note 244, at 85–88; Lehnardt, supra note 200, at 140. 
Describing private military contractors in Iraq, Lehnardt notes that “there appears to be 
little effort to maintain effective control over their activities.” Id. Lehnard also points out 
that the contractors identified as being involved in the abuses at Abu Ghraib have not 
been charged with a crime, whereas army and marine soldiers have been. Id. at 141. See 
also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF DEF., ACQUISITION: CONTRACTS AWARDED 
FOR THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BY THE DEFENSE CONTRACTING 
COMMAND—WASHINGTON, Rep. No. D-2004-057, at 24 (2004) (noting that in a study of 
twenty-four contracts issued between February 2003 and August 2005, valued in total at 
$122.5 million, “[thirteen] did not have adequate surveillance of contractors”). 
 302. Cases may, of course, arise in which the government exercises sufficient control 
over the day-to-day activities of a contractor so as to make the contractor an agent of the 
government for purposes of the government-agency defense. In such circumstances, 
combatant-activities preemption and the government-agency defense will both be availa-
ble to the contractor. However, as the Eleventh Circuit articulated in McMahon v. Presi-
dential Airways, Inc., even where a contractor is deemed to be an agent, the court may 
still require the contractor to justify the grant of immunity affirmatively. 502 F.3d 1331, 
1345–46 (11th Cir. 2007). Given the courts’ hostility to Feres, a contractor, whether an 
agent or not, might make a more compelling argument for protection under the principles 
animating combatant-activities preemption than under a theory of derivative sovereign 
immunity. 
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1. Evidence and the Supervision Inquiry 
Assuming arguendo that combatant-activities preemption is a viable 
defense, and that control and supervision form a necessary element, how 
is a court to determine when preemption is applicable? To which eviden-
tiary sources should a court look? A court’s analysis might turn on the 
scope of the contractor’s authority under the applicable regulations or the 
facts on the ground. These inquiries may provide different answers as to 
whether preemption is appropriate. 
This tension is evident in Ibrahim v. Titan Corp.303 In Ibrahim, plain-
tiffs rejected the defendants’ attempt to rely on combatant-activities 
preemption.304 They argued that the district court reached the wrong con-
clusion when applying its own preemption test—whether the contractors 
were under “exclusive operational control” of the military.305 They also 
maintained that a finding of exclusive operational control was inappro-
priate because it was contrary to Army regulations,306 pointing to Army 
Regulation 715-9, which prescribes policies for managing contractors 
accompanying the force.307 This regulation specifies that the commercial 
firm(s) providing the battlefield support services will “perform the ne-
cessary supervisory and management functions of their employees since 
[c]ontractor employees are not under the direct supervision of military 
personnel in the chain of command.”308 The military could not have ex-
ercised exclusive control over the defendants in this situation, asserted 
the plaintiffs, because the contractor supervisors controlled contractor 
employees,309 and therefore, preemption was not fitting.310 
In response, defendants argued that courts assessing the application of 
the combatant-activities exception have “always grounded their decisions 
on the facts as they occurred,” and that this analysis is what matters when 
considering interference with unique federal interests.311 Moreover, ap-
                                                                                                                                     
 303. Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 304. Id. at 10. 
 305. Joint Final Brief of Appellants at 19–21, Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., No. 04-1248, 
Saleh v. Titan Corp., No. 05-1165 (D.D.C. Oct. 16, 2007) [hereinafter Joint Final Brief]. 
 306. Id. at 32. 
 307. U.S. Dep’t of Army Regulation 715-9, Contractors Accompanying the Force 
(Oct. 29, 1999), available at http://www.aschq.army.mil/gc/files/AR715-9.pdf. 
 308. Id. § 3-2(f); DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-100.21, CONTRACTORS ON THE 
BATTLEFIELD § 4-45 (2003) (“Maintaining discipline of contractor employees is the re-
sponsibility of the contractor’s management structure, not the military chain of com-
mand.”); Joint Final Brief, supra note 305, at 32. 
 309. Id. at 32–35.  
 310. Id. at 35, 39–45. 
 311. Post-Hearing Memorandum of CACI International, Inc. and CACI Premier Tech-
nology, Inc., in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 5–6, Ibrahim v. Titan 
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proaching the question otherwise would place the court in the “untenable 
position” of deciding what the military “should do in a combat situation 
when faced with an exigent need for civilian interrogators.”312 
The plaintiffs’ argument in Ibrahim is peculiar because it offered 
law—the regulations—to prove a fact. This approach is faulty. There is 
no dispute that the legal restrictions on contractors are not actually ob-
served.313 The military or another agency will demonstrate operational 
control or supervision through actual interaction with contractors. Con-
tractual terms and regulations inform the question of control, but they 
themselves are not determinative. The district court in Ibrahim justifiably 
adopted the “facts on the ground” perspective314: if the record demon-
strates that the military exercised control in fact, then contrary regula-
tions do not alter this conclusion.315 
However, the regulations and the contract under which the contractors 
operated are relevant as part of a court’s legal evaluation of the federal 
interest(s) at issue. The fact that regulations place an activity beyond the 
power of the contractor provides important evidence that no federal in-
terest is at stake in protecting the contractor.316 With this in mind, the 
facts on the ground should prevail against inconsistent regulations. 
2. Cases of Narrowly Defined Contractor Discretion and Effective Gov-
ernment Control: The Federal Interests That Preemption Serves 
This Article has argued that combatant-activities preemption of claims 
arising from a contractor’s tortious conduct undertaken in the exercise of 
                                                                                                                                     
Corp., 2007 WL 3319823 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2007); Post-Hearing Memorandum of Defen-
dant L-3 Communications Titan Corp. in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment at 
2–3, Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2007). 
 312. See supra note 311 and accompanying text. 
 313. See KIDWELL, supra note 205 (noting that intelligence gathering is characterized 
as an inherently governmental function, but contractors are performing it anyway). 
 314. Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 315. See KIDWELL, supra note 205, at 53 (quoting Assistant Secretary of the Army 
Patrick T. Henry for the proposition that intelligence gathering at the tactical level is an 
intrinsically governmental function). Indeed, the law in other contexts imposes liability 
against corporations and other entities for violations by their agents even where their 
internal rules expressly prohibit the conduct in question. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson R.R. 
Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 491–95 (1909) (upholding the constitutionality of the 
Elkins Act, which made corporations liable for the acts of their officers, even where the 
officers were acting contrary to instructions); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 
F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972) (addressing criminal antitrust liability). 
 316. In other words, to the extent that regulations specify that contractors should not 
engage in a particularly activity, this at least suggests that the federal government might 
have little interest in protecting contracts when they injure someone while performing the 
contract. 
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his or her broad discretion is inappropriate. Furnishing a preemption de-
fense in such cases will do little to meaningfully encourage action that 
serves U.S. interests, and would come at too great a cost to other stake-
holders. Circumstances might arise, however, in which the military’s 
control over a contractor is high and the contractor’s discretion is minim-
al. 
Contractors do not form a de jure part of the military chain of com-
mand.317 They may form a de facto component, however. Consider the 
facts of Titan v. Ibrahim Corp. and Saleh v. Titan Corp.318 In both of 
these cases, the district court concluded that Titan linguists and interro-
gators were subject to the control of their military unit commander at all 
relevant times, and Titan employees were wholly excluded from supervi-
sory roles.319 When translating or interrogating alongside military per-
sonnel, Titan contractors were not to second-guess or disagree with their 
military counterparts.320 Although internal Army investigations suggest 
that a lack of supervision at Army interrogation centers contributed to the 
abuses, the district judge found that the military exercised strict control 
over Titan personnel.321 
In cases of tight military-contractor integration, a civil suit against con-
tractors would likely reveal highly sensitive military information such as 
interrogation tactics, military operational orders, and secret counter-
terrorism activities.322 The primary focus of a court’s inquiry would no 
longer be the contractor’s discretion in taking certain allegedly tortious 
actions. Rather, the government’s own conduct would be relevant. Ac-
cordingly, the military’s own procedures, the adequacy and propriety of 
instructions, cautionary statements, and orders to contractors and to other 
soldiers would be scrutinized. Truly, the government can state no unique 
federal interest in the abuse of prisoners or derogation from international 
                                                                                                                                     
 317. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.2d 1331, 1348 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(“[A] private contractor is not in the chain of command.”). 
 318. Ibrahim, 556 F. Supp. 2d 1; Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 
2006).  
 319. Ibrahim, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 5. 
 320. Id. 
 321. See GEORGE R. FAY, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU GHRAIB DETEN-
TION FACILITY AND 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 52 (2004), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nationi/documents/fay_report_8-25-04.pdf (de-
scribing the prevailing conditions of lawlessness at Abu Ghraib prison). 
 322. The author recognizes, as courts have, that the United States has an interest in 
insulating military decisions from judicial scrutiny. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507, 518 (2004) (detention as an “important incident[] of war”) (internal quotes re-
moved). This should not be confused, however, with the view that the United States has 
an interest in promoting torture or mistreatment of prisoners. 
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human rights norms. But beyond detainee treatment, preemption has a far 
more relevant role where the military has integrated contractors in intel-
ligence gathering or surveillance activities.323 
Courts have recognized the unique federal interest in insulating mili-
tary decisions from judicial inquiry, finding that even tangential intru-
sions into military decision making may pose a threat to military discip-
line.324 This extra-cautious approach can be appropriate because judges 
are not well positioned to understand and evaluate the effects of such 
intrusion.325 The court in McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc. ac-
                                                                                                                                     
 323. One could also imagine a case in which the contractors accompanying Special 
Forces units along the Afghan border assist in capturing an alleged terrorist. Following 
instructions from the military, they subject the detainee to what he or she later alleges 
was rough treatment. Imagine that he or she sues the military and the contractor. Discov-
ery would likely yield facts analogous to those in Titan—that the military effectively 
directed the contractor’s conduct. Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 
2005). Recall that contractors have also maintained and operated weapons systems on-
board warships during combat operations. SCHREIR & CAPARINI, supra note 201, at 22, 
25. What would the result be where a contractor negligently calibrates a weapons system 
causing a missile to strike a civilian or U.S. military target? On board the vessel, the con-
tractors are likely to be under close supervision and to be following detailed instructions. 
 324. Under this rationale, courts have upheld the dismissal of a plaintiff-soldier’s suit 
against the military in connection with a recreational boating accident. McConnell v. 
United States, 478 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2007). The court found that dismissal was 
appropriate because the suit would require discovery into the military’s maintenance of 
the boat and the adequacy of the instructions concerning its use. Id. In another case, fears 
of an adverse impact on discipline prompted the court to dismiss a claim arising from the 
drowning of soldiers in a military-sponsored rafting trip, even where civilian guides were 
the alleged tortfeasors. Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001). Many cir-
cuits have found military discipline to be threatened in the Feres context in a wide variety 
of recreation-based accidents. See, e.g., Rayner v. United States, 760 F.2d 1217 (11th Cir. 
1985) (finding that Feres barred a malpractice suit where the soldier sought elective med-
ical care from the military provider); Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138, 1141 (4th Cir. 
1975) (concerning a serviceman injured in an accident involving a horse rented from a 
Marine Corps-operated stable). 
 325. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983) (“Civilian courts must, at the very 
least, hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper with the estab-
lished relationship between enlisted military personnel and their superior officers . . . .”); 
Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) (“The military constitutes a specialized 
community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian. Orderly govern-
ment requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army 
matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters.”); Fisher v. 
United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Holzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 
1307, 1310 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1973). Nor will courts hear cases 
that threaten to significantly impede combat effectiveness. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 
U.S. 763, 779 (1950) (“It would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field 
commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call 
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knowledged these concerns and identified a class of suits involving “sen-
sitive military judgments” that courts should not hear as a matter of pru-
dence.326 Combatant-activities preemption also recognizes such a class of 
suits, vindicating the federal interest in avoiding inquiries into sensitive 
military decisions.327 
The recognition of these federal interests—which are not present in 
cases where contractors enjoy broad discretion—does not negate the po-
werful arguments against preemption that this Article has addressed. The 
preferred method for protecting contractors is by congressional action or 
executive indemnification.328 However, in cases where contractor discre-
tion is minimal and the contractor is subject to extensive government 
control, preemption is appropriate. This should be the case so long as 
courts continue to recognize the interest preemption protects—the U.S. 
interest in avoiding interference with sensitive decision making—as suf-
ficiently important to trump the nation’s interest in permitting plaintiffs 
to use the courts to obtain redress for wrongs. Boyle’s holding, that a suit 
against contractors may be preempted where tort liability would be in-
consistent with a unique federal interest (deriving from either the discre-
tionary-function exception or the combatant-activities exception), may be 
understood to sanction this outcome.329 The scope of a preemption de-
fense rooted in contractors’ participation in the combatant activities of 
the United States hinges on the meaning of “control” and the amount of 
permissible contractor discretion. 
Preemption is proper where contractor discretion is so narrow that a 
decision, order, or instruction of the military or other government agency 
becomes the true fact of interest.330 This occurs where contractor actions 
                                                                                                                                     
him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the mili-
tary offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home.”). 
 326. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1353 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 327. See Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2007) (“It is the military 
chain of command that the FTCA’s combatant activities exception serves to safeguard, 
however, and common law claims against private contractors will be preempted only to 
the extent necessary to insulate military decisions from state law regulation.”). 
 328. See, e.g., Ben Davidson, Note, Liability on the Battlefield: Adjudicating Tort Suits 
Brought by Soldiers Against Military Contractors, 37 PUB. CONT. L.J. 803, 806, 839–41 
(2008) (proposing a congressional indemnification scheme). 
 329. See Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(“Although Boyle referred specifically to procurement contracts, the analysis it requires is 
not designed to promote all-or-nothing rules regarding different classes of contract. Ra-
ther, the question is whether subjecting a contractor to liability under state tort law would 
create a significant conflict with a unique federal interest.”) (citing Glassco v. Miller 
Equip. Co., 966 F.2d 641, 642 (11th Cir.1992)). 
 330. Titan Corporation made this argument in its brief to the D.C. Circuit. Corrected 
Final Brief of Defendant-Appellee Titan Corp. at 27, Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., Nos. 08-
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are necessarily bound up with military action. Although this Article has 
primarily addressed the case of negligent conduct by a contractor, the 
end combatant-activities preemption can serve, protecting military deci-
sions, can be achieved even where the contractor acts intentionally. The 
key element remains whether the conduct resulted from government di-
rection rather than an exercise of contractor discretion. 
Determining whether the discretion of a contractor has exceeded the 
critical threshold is a fact-sensitive analysis, and the amount of permissi-
ble discretion will vary from case to case. A court should permit a com-
paratively greater degree of discretion—within a range of reasonable-
ness—where the conduct at issue is particularly sensitive. The polar star 
of the court’s inquiry must be to protect military decision making and 
military discipline, not a contractor’s discretionary act.331   
3. The Breadth of Combatant-Activities Preemption and the Meaning of 
“Control” 
A court may approach measuring and defining “control” in various 
ways.332 One approach would be to adopt the Boyle criteria explicitly, for 
which there is precedent.333 But applying the Boyle factors mechanically 
is inappropriate in cases involving contractor torts arising from participa-
tion in combatant activities. The Boyle government-contractor defense, 
as the Supreme Court described it, does not shield contractor negli-
gence.334 Of course, contractors should generally not be immune, from 
                                                                                                                                     
7008, 08-7009 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 3, 2008) (“To put it another way, where contractor em-
ployees are placed under the military’s operational control on the battlefield, the em-
ployees’ actions in a meaningful sense constitute the actions of the military.”). 
 331. The court in Ibrahim articulated this view. Ibrahim, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 3. 
 332. See Kateryna L. Rakowsky, Note, Military Contractors and Civil Liability: Use of 
the Government Contractor Defense to Escape Allegations of Misconduct in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 365, 388 (2006). See also supra note 71 and accom-
panying text. 
 333. Rakowsky also contemplates this idea. Rakowsky, supra note 332. In Hudgens v. 
Bell Helicopter/Textron, for example, the Eleventh Circuit found the Boyle defense appli-
cable where contractor DynCorp, which had contracted to maintain military helicopters, 
negligently caused the crash of an Army pilot. Hudgens v. Bell Helicopter/Textron, 328 
F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2003). The court determined that because DynCorp followed a rea-
sonably precise, comprehensive maintenance regime, it was not expected to supplement 
its own procedures. Id. at 1334–35. 
 334. “[T]ort liability principles properly seek to impose liability on the wrongdoer 
whose act or omission caused the injury, not on the otherwise innocent contractor whose 
only role in causing the injury was the proper performance of a plan supplied by the gov-
ernment.” In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 793–94 (E.D.N.Y. 
1980), rev’d on other grounds, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied Chapman v. 
Dow Chemical Co., 454 U.S. 1128 (1981); Barron v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 868 F. Supp. 
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civil or criminal liability, for illegal or tortious acts. Yet, this is not the 
appropriate result in a combat situation. A contractor’s good faith but 
negligent execution of military instructions in a combat context should 
not forfeit the defense. The federal interests present where contractor 
discretion is minimal do not disappear. Indeed, these interests require 
vindication in spite of the contractor’s tort.335 
Ibrahim v. Titan Corp presents another option for defining and measur-
ing control in this context. In Ibrahim, the court articulated a “soldier in 
all but name” test, under which defendants would succeed in their 
preemption argument where they could show that they were under the 
“exclusive operational control” of the military.336 This test is itself sub-
ject to varying interpretations, as it leaves open questions as to whether 
contractors must be following direct orders, or merely operating under 
the guidance and instruction of the military.337 The court’s formulation in 
Ibrahim appropriately sacrifices the advantages of a bright-line rule for a 
fact-specific inquiry. However, even the fact-specific “soldier in all but 
name” test may be too narrow. This test purports to confine combatant-
activities preemption to cases in which the contractor works alongside 
the military. Although this is normally the case, preemption may also be 
warranted even where the contractor is not acting as a soldier.338 
A suitable formulation of control might also be derived from the lan-
guage of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in Nicaragua v. Unit-
                                                                                                                                     
1203, 1207 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (“[R]equisite conflict exists only where a contractor cannot 
at the same time comply with duties under state law and duties under a federal con-
tract.”). 
 335. Of course, a contractor’s flagrant and/or repeated negligence will suggest that the 
military or another government agency really exerts little control over the contractor. The 
other possibility—that the military is complicit in the contractor’s errors—is not incon-
ceivable. 
 336. Ibrahim, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 3 (“In the context of preemption, the federal interest 
embodied by the exception is the same. Where contract employees are under the direct 
command and exclusive operational control of the military chain of command such that 
they are functionally serving as soldiers, preemption ensures that they need not weigh the 
consequences of obeying military orders against the possibility of exposure to state law 
liability.”). 
 337. See Rakowsky, supra note 332. 
 338. Consider a hypothetical case akin to United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 
(1987). A contractor works under the supervision of civilian air controllers of a govern-
ment agency and provides positioning information to military pilots in a declared combat 
zone. The contractor negligently misinforms the pilot, causing a crash that kills him or 
her and several civilians. The contractor’s actions are likely to qualify as combatant activ-
ities under case law. Although the contractor was not functioning as a soldier, there was 
close government supervision of the contractor’s operations and, thus, preemption is 
arguably justified. 
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ed States.339 In this case, the ICJ examined whether the United States 
could be held liable for the acts of the paramilitary forces it sponsored in 
Nicaragua, and what level of control the U.S. government must exert 
over those forces in order to incur liability.340 The court found that the 
United States was not liable because it failed to exercise “effective con-
trol” over those forces.341 The flexibility of the court’s “effective control” 
test is both necessary and dangerous in the context of combatant-
activities preemption. 
Contractors, such as those responsible for the abuses at Abu Ghraib, 
should not be able to avoid civil liability by demonstrating nominal su-
pervision by the military. The Supreme Court in Boyle recognized that 
when the government dictates, monitors, and approves manufacturing 
specifications and the manufacturing process, the conduct in question is 
really the government’s. Courts should view the applicability of the 
combatant-activities exception to private actors in a similar manner. 
Combatant-activities preemption can protect vital government interests, 
but it is only appropriate when government conduct substantially circum-
scribes contractor discretion.342 
                                                                                                                                     
 339. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 65 (June 27). 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. at 64. 
 342. For example, in Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc., the North-
ern District of Georgia concluded that the plaintiff’s negligence action against the con-
tractor was nonjusticiable on political question grounds. Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & 
Root Servs., Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1372 (N.D. Ga. 2008). As part of its ruling, the 
court found that “the army controlled the conduct of Carmichael’s convoy at the most 
granular level” because the military determined the convoy’s route, speed, and following 
distance to the exclusion of Kellogg, Brown & Roots’ own supervisors. Id. at 1369. Un-
like McMahon, where the Presidential pilots had wide discretion (and apparently used it), 
the army in Carmichael appeared to have exercised control sufficient to virtually elimi-
nate Kellogg, Brown & Roots’ discretion—at least sufficient to call into question its or-
ders in a lawsuit. Id. at 1368–69. Similar to Titan, this case presents an example of the 
type of control courts should require before applying the combatant-activities exception 
to private actors. 
  One can apply the effective-control analysis to the facts of McMahon v. Presiden-
tial Airways, Inc., for example. In McMahon, the contractor was engaged in combatant 
activity at the time of the accident. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 
2d 1315, 1318, 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2006) Although the contractor was subject to certain 
restrictions, such as what routes to fly and at what altitude, the pilots caused the plane to 
veer off course, crashing into a box canyon eighty miles off the designated route. NAT’L 
TRANSP. SAFETY BD., AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BRIEF, ACCIDENT NUMBER IAD05FA023, at 
19, Nov. 8, 2006, available at http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/query.asp. The National Trans-
portation Safety Board’s postcrash analysis concluded that the pilot had decided to use an 
alternate route “for fun” and his failure to use the oxygen system contributed to his im-
paired judgment while flying. Id. at 19–20. The contractor’s own negligence caused the 
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Having explored the disadvantages of protecting a contractor’s discre-
tionary acts, the courts’ application of the preemption defense that draws 
on the combatant-activities exception must be flexible. Regarding this 
exception, the courts’ determination of effective control cannot be for-
mulaic and should not depend on whether the contractor functioned as a 
soldier. It must also consider the extent of the contractor’s discretion, if 
any, within the precise context in which he or she exercised it. If the con-
tractor’s conduct involves activities, such as intelligence gathering or 
military maneuvers, in which the nation’s interest in protecting military 
decision making and execution from judicial second-guessing is at its 
apex, the ends of preemption are served, even where the contractor exer-
cises slightly more discretion than he or she would in a context more re-
mote from core military interests.343 The courts’ inquiry, accordingly, 
should be about “effective” control, judged with regard to the role 
preemption plays in protecting a unique federal interest, the amount of 
discretion (if any) the contractor exercises, and the context in which the 
contractor acts. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored the defenses and immunities that may protect 
private military service contractors from civil liability. It has argued that 
the government-agency defense, while potentially applicable to service 
contractors, should be narrowly drawn. In addition, the principles recog-
nized by courts to underlie the combatant-activities exception as applied 
                                                                                                                                     
crash. Id. The NTSB blamed Presidential Airways for the accident, but also noted that the 
Department of Defense did not provide adequate oversight of the contractor’s operations 
in Afghanistan in what was “clearly a military operation subject to [Department of De-
fense] control.” Id. at 22–23, 25; SCAHILL, supra note 20, at 248. The company admitted 
that the military lacked supervision and control over the performance of the mission. 
McMahon Appellate Brief, supra note 127, at 32 (“Presidential was completely subject to 
the military’s control, except as to the physical performance of the mission.”). The scope 
of the contractor’s discretion in this case is sufficiently broad to preclude combatant-
activities preemption. Even if a court could find that the government controlled the con-
tractor’s freedom of action, permitting the suit to proceed would not jeopardize critical 
federal interests. Although the contractor could contend that a failure to preempt would 
negatively affect military discipline by questioning the military’s orders, this claim 
should fail. The plaintiff’s claim does not have anything to do with the military’s practice 
of employing contractor pilots. Instead, the plaintiff’s claim hinges on the contractor’s 
own negligence. Thus, this case is distinguishable from cases such as McConnell v. Unit-
ed States, 478 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2007), where the allegations of negligence went 
to maintenance of and instructions concerning the use of military recreational boats. 
 343. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950) (describing the nation’s 
interest in forcing military officials to testify to sensitive decisions at trials in the United 
States). 
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to the federal government, namely, avoiding interference with sensitive 
military decision making, can similarly justify the preemption of civil 
claims against service contractors. However, preemption of a wronged 
plaintiff’s claims under the combatant-activities exception can wreak a 
clear injustice. Therefore, courts must frame combatant-activities pre-
emption as narrowly as possible while still protecting critical federal in-
terests. This balance is arguably achieved by only allowing preemption 
in cases where the contractor was under the supervision and control of 
the military. 
The wisdom of the military’s widespread use of contractors remains a 
decision for the political branches. This Article’s conclusion that 
preemption may apply to service contractors does not mean that the im-
punity of contractors should be tolerated. Success in Iraq and Afghanis-
tan demands that the United States foster a culture of accountability, and 
it should start by enforcing criminal sanctions against its soldiers and 
contractors who break the law. Agencies employing contractors should 
integrate clear guidelines and limitations into contracts with PMCs, with 
particular regard to their duty to respect the rights of civilians in zones of 
armed conflict.344 On a broader scale, the United States needs a coherent 
national policy on private military contractors. Congress should take up 
this policy challenge in earnest. 
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